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On Wednesday, 5 July, 1961, the Twelfth Biannual Convention of
the Law Councils of Australia, meeting in Sydney, was opened by
the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Porter. He was one of a
number of distinguished international jurists, including the Chief
Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, who had
come to join the Australian judiciary and other members of the
legal fraternity at the seven hundred strong Convention. Early next
morning there was an official service at St Andrew's Cathedral at
which the preacher was the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, Dr H.
R. Gough who had been installed two years earlier as the seventh
holder of the See. The topic of the sermon was the legal
enforcement of morals and its importance for national life at a time
of continuing Cold War crisis.
In the circumstances, most of those attending the service
presumably expected the Archbishop to preach a well prepared but
not particularly controversial sermon on religion, morality and the
law. Newspaper reporters in the cOJ1gregation, however, were not
quite so sure. 'Journalists had been tipped off to expect something
unusual', according to Peter Coleman who was present at the
occasion for the Bulletin, 'but few', he writes, 'foresaw the furore
that followed the sermon'.l The 'something unusual' turned out to
be an attack on certain unnamed university teachers in Sydney. In
the course of his sermon the Archbishop claimed that there were
academics in Australian universities, particularly in Sydney, who
were aiding the Communist cause by teaching godless and se~ually
immoral soul-destroying philosophies. The unnamed teachers Dr
Gough had in mind were soon revealed to be three prominent
academics at the University of Sydney, Emeritus Professor John
Anderson and Professors A. K. Stout and W. M. O'Neil.
The controversy which followed the Archbishop's remarks
completely overshadowed newspaper reports of the remaining days
of the Law Convention and largely ignored his Cold War concerns.
At first it centred on whether the identified academics and others
had taught such doctrines but it soon came to embrace or touch
1 Peter Coleman, Memoirs of a Slow Learner, Sydney, 1994, pp. 155-6.
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upon a number of other issues: academic freedom, the secular
character and independence of Australian universities, the teaching
of philosophy, and, at its widest remove, attitudes towards Thomism
by Catholic philosophers, and questions about the conditions which
should govern the study of religion in secular universities. The most
vigorous newspaper! phase of the controversy was in the fIrst couple
of weeks after the sermon but its echoes and ramifications reached
well into 1962. Its end, in terms of Archbishop Gough's specific
charges, might be said to be marked by the Report of the New South
Wales Youth Policy Advisory Committee which was ordered to be
printed by Parliament on 30 October, 1962. In its abstracted form,
the controversy came to rest with Professor J. L. Mackie's article,
'Religion and the University' in Vestes, September, 1962.2
I
There can be little doubt that the invitation to preach the
Convention sermon provided the Archbishop with a difficult
challenge. He had to speak briefly but usefully to a distinguished
audience on some topic in the area of law, morality, and religion.
This would not be an easy task for a bishop with a strong
background in the more philosophical theological disciplines, but it
would be even more testing for someone, such as Gough, whose
Unless otherwise indicated, the year dates are 1961. Abbreviations of
newspapers and journals: ACR (The Australian Church Record); Ad (The
Advocate, Melbourne); CW (The Catholic Weekly, Sydney); DT (The Daily
Telegraph, Sydney); HS (Honi Soit, student newspaper, University of Sydney);
SC (Southern Cross, Sydney Diocesan Magazine); TA (The Anglican); TM (The
Mirror, Sydney); TS (The Sun, Sydney); SMH (The Sydney Morning Herald).
2 An account of diverse issues involved in the controversy can be obtained by
combining Peter Coleman, op. cit., ch. 12 and 'Who Put the Arsenic in the
Chocolate?', in The Bulletin, 19/8/61. See also: A. J. Baker, Anderson's
Social Philosophy, Sydney, 1979, pp. 141 ff.; Kenneth Cable and Stephen
Judd, Sydney Anglicans, Sydney, 1987, pp. 273-4 and F. James' review, SMH
(12/3/88); Brian Kennedy, A Passion to Oppose, Melbourne, 1995, pp. 195-7;
David Hilliard, 'Church, Family and Sexuality in Australia in the 19505,' in
The Forgotten Fifties, eds, John Murphy and Judith Smart, Special Issue,
Australian Historical Studies, 28 (109), 1997. Useful contemporary guides are
to be found in TA (14/7) and 'The Archbishop and the Philosophers: A Note,'
in Vestes, 5 (1), p. 30, 1962. The late Professor A. K. Stout's papers in the
Archives of the University of Sydney contain an important collection of
material relating to the controversy. I am indebted to the Archives staff for
their help.
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intellectual strengths were not of this kind. In the circumstances it
appears that the Archbishop was prepared to take counsel on what
he might consider in preparing for the occasion. His sermon
certainly reflects the influence of two recent writings: one, a locally
produced pamphlet, Empiricism and Freedom (1959) by Dr V. K.
Kinsella, a Sydney surgeon; the other, Sir Patrick Devlin's 'The
Enforcement of Morals', the 1959 Maccabaean Lecture on
Jurisprudence at the British Academy, a much discussed paper
amongst legal philosophers during the next decade. The
Archbishop's source for the Kinsella paper was Judge Adrian
Curlewis, who probably drew his attention to Devlin's lecture as
well. l
Curlewis, a judge in the District Court of N.S.W. and a leading
figure in the Australian Surf Life Saving Association had been
made chairman, in November 1960, of The New South Wales Youth
Policy Advisory Committee, appointed by the Minister of
Education. It had come into being because of growing public
concern by the churches and others about changing youth mores
and questions about whether a new and morally disturbing youth
culture was emerging, as some, such as Archbishop Gough,
believed. The Committee's task was in general 'to inquire into and
study the needs of Youth and then to advise the Government of New
South Wales on an appropriate Youth Policy'. In his approach to
the task of his Committee, Curlewis found Devlin's lecture to be of
great value: an extract was listed in the Committee's Report as one
of a number of statements which provided guiding principles used
by it in reaching its recommendations.2 Devlin's concerns, however,
On Archbishop Gough's background, see: 'The Primacy of Graham', in Nation,
73, 15/7/61; Stephen Judd and Kenneth Cable, Ope cit., pp. 263-65; obituaries
in the London Times and Daily Telegraph, and 5MB, 22/11/97, and Bishop Sir
Marcus Loane's eulogy, Southern Cross Quarterly, Summer 1997. On Judge Sir
Adrian Curlewis, see obituary, SMH (21/6/88) and Philippa Poole, Of Love and
War, Sydney, 1982 and 1988. Concerning Lord Devlin's 'lecture, see Richard
A. Wasserstrom, ed., Morality and the Law, Belmont, Ca., 1971.
2 In his presidential address to the 1960 synod Gough said that he had come to
the conclusion that 'a considerable proportion of our young people are
amoral.' (Year Book of the Diocese of Sydney... 1961, Sydney, 1961, p. 222.)
The leading editorial in 5MB (19/10/60) attacked what it called The Primate's
Cures for our Moral Ills; see also the editorial in The Sun Herald (23/10/60),
and the remarks of the Minister for Education (E. Wetherall) in S M H
(29/10/60). The aims of the Curlewis Committee: Report of the New South
Wales Youth Policy Advisory Committee, Sydney, 1963 (as separately
printed), p. 7; references to Devlin, pp. 49, 156. In the A. K. Stout papers in
the Archives of the University of Sydney there is a copy of a letter from Judge
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were primarily jurisprudential, not moral or policy related, though
his position on the enforcement of morals and the role of religion
in sustaining morality obviously had general policy implications.!
His lecture is in large part an attack on a principle used in the
English Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and
Prostitution (1957), the Wolfenden Report, in recommending that
homosexual acts between consenting adults be no longer treated as
offences under the criminal law. The principle to which Devlin took
objection is that the law should be concerned with matters of public,
not private morality. Homosexual relations in private between
consenting adults, the Committee had argued, are not public matters
and ought not to be subject to the criminal law. Devlin was not
directly concerned with whether or not homosexual practices were a
threat to social life or the public welfare - he was prepared to leave
to that question to experienced judges and others - but with whether
the distinction between public and private morality was acceptable
or useful for jurisprudential purposes. In his view it was not. Any
immoral act, he claimed, could be of social significance, but there
are various classes of immoral acts and not all of them are or should
be of concern to the law. Some because no law against them could
be effectively enforced; others because their immorality is uncertain
or contested; and others again because the law of a free people must
allow as much tolerance of a citizen's behaviour as is compatible
with the essential welfare or integrity of society. The tolerance of a
society in relation to particular immoral acts is apt to change over
time with the result that some forms of immorality previously
tolerated or ignored by the law become matters of legal concern,
e.g., incest, whereas others cease to be offences against the criminal
code. The social framework within which this occurs, Devlin argued,
is a widely and deeply shared set of moral principles within the
society which indicate what is and what is not decent human
conduct. It is, he claimed, a morality understood by most people,
the morality accepted by 'the man on the Clapham omnibus'. This
Curlewis to Mr Alex Carey (item 908) commending to his attention certain
quotations from Devlin's lecture.
See, e.g., Proceedings of the British Academy 1959, p. 132 for Devlin's
statement of his interest in the issue as a judge. Also note his claims: 'an
established morality is as necessary as good government to the welfare of
society. Societies disintegrate from within more frequently than they are
broken up by external pressures.' (p. 140); 'No society has yet solved the
problem of how to teach morality without religion. ... without the help of
Christian teaching the law will fail.' (p. 151).
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common understanding of moral matters in British society is rooted
in the Christian past of the country and remains so despite the fact
that religious belief or disbelief is now no longer seen as having
direct bearing on the welfare of the nation. The same situation
generally prevails in Western countries:
Morals and religion are inextricably joined - the moral standards
generally accepted in Western civilization countries being those
belongi~g to Christianity. 1
In terms of this approach, according to Devlin, immoral acts such as
adultery and fornication are not matters for the criminal code
whereas bigamy is.
In England we believe in the Christian idea of marriage and
therefore adopt monogamy as a moral principle. Consequently
the Christian institution of marriage has become the basis of
family life and so part of the structure of our society. It is there
not because it is Christian. It has got there because it is Christian,
but it remains there because it is built into the house in which we
live and could not be removed without bringing it down.2
Whether or not homosexual behaviour should be subject to the
criminal law does not depend upon whether it is performed in
private or public but whether the act is such as is likely to have
serious consequences for the moral welfare essential to the integrity
of the society. The measure of that welfare in England is, as a matter
of fact, the historic and still accepted Christian principles which have
shaped the common moral understanding and expectations of the
people.
For anyone of a conservative moral and social persuasion,
Devlin's argument provided welcome support against tampering too
readily with those features of the criminal law in the West which
enforced traditional Christian moral prohibitions. It is hardly
surprising that the Archbishop found it a useful source for the first
part of his sermon where he sets out a framework for answering the
question 'How far, if at all, should the Criminal Law of a country
On the Wolfenden Report, see Lord John Wolfenden, Turning Points, London,
1976, ch. 8; National Deviancy Conference, ed., Permissiveness and Control,
London, 1980, ch. 1 (by Stuart Hall). Devlin: Clapham omnibus, Ope cit., p.
142; morals and religion, ibid., p. 132.
2 Ibid., p. 137.
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concern itself with the enforcement of morals' .(ACR, 20/7, p.3)1
Gough pointed out that not all forms of immorality or sins are
crimes: some are, such as bigamy and homosexual acts; others are
not, for example, fornication, adultery. What is the basis of the
distinction? The answer, Gough claimed, depends upon
understanding the purpose and the historical shaping of the law.
The legal system is concerned with protecting the liberty of the
individual and the welfare of the nation. But the liberty of the
individual is not absolute: it has to be exercised with respect to the
liberty of others and the welfare of the society. But how is the
welfare of society to be determined? The answer is to be found in
the historic moral traditions which structure the life of the society,
'the basic accepted standards which lie at the heart of national well
being' (p.3). These are the principles whose presence is expressed
in the 'repugnance felt by the conscience of society'(p.3) when
they are flaunted. In the British nation these 'basic accepted
standards' have been determined by the Christian religion, but their
living authority does not depend upon a belief in the religion which
has shaped them but in their acceptance and their place in the
continuing practice of the people. The law against bigamy, for
example, applies to Christian believer and unbeliever 'not because it
is Christian but because it has been adopted through long history by
the society in which they live. It is so much part of the house in
which we live that we could not remove it without bringing down the
whole building' (p.5). And this, the Archbishop claimed, applies
generally to the basic moral standards of Britain and the West: 'The
moral standards of Western Culture so much arise out of the
Christian religion that Christianity cannot be abandoned without
destroying the nations of the West' (p.5).
The unacknowledged influence and borrowings from Devlin's
lecture would have been noted by some of the congregation, as the
Archbishop might well have expected, but few, other than those who
had followed his public statements since arriving in Australia, would
have expected that the sermon would then quickly turn to Cold War
issues.
He introduced this theme by referring to the trial of the war
criminal, Adolph Eichmannn, in Israel. Nazi Germany, Gough
claimed, was the product of a long series of attempts by secular
philosophers and modernising theologians to separate the German
1 The sermon was printed in two forms: publicly in ACR (20/7), pp. 3, 5 and
separately as a four page pamphlet for private distribution. A copy of the latter
is in the A. K. Stout papers (item 871) accompanied by a With Compliments
note from the Archbishop.
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people from their traditional Christian roots. The end result, he
asserted, had been Eichmann and his like. Communism, however,
posed an even greater threat than Nazism. And the present danger
was that Communism might win by default because there are those
who seek to separate the Western democracies from their historic
Christian morality, thereby giving easy entry to Communist ideas
about liberty, the importance of the individual, the place of religion
and the authority of the state. The often unwitting leaders of this
internal threat were the intellectuals who attack the religious view of
man and traditional moral standards. The end result, he claimed, was
moral impotence and despair in which resolute opposition to
Communism is replaced with a policy of 'Better to be Red than
Dead', 'now being widely advocated in the Western World' (p.5).
In developing this case Gough went far beyond the material he
found in Devlin's lecture. His opposition to changing mores and
legal reform of the kind shown by the Wolfenden Report as well as
his conservative political convictions about dissent of the type
associated with the campaigns for nuclear disarmament are more
likely to have drawn support from the second work which he
consulted in preparing his sermon, Kinsella's Empiricism and
Freedom. The influence of this pamphlet upon his sermon appeared
when Gough gave local relevance to his claim about the internal
intellectual threat to the Western democracies by saying that there
was evidence before the N.S.W. Youth Policy Committee to show
that the same danger was to be found in Australia and particularly
in Sydney. The evidence, whose source and nature he did not
specify, was Kinsella's pamphlet, as Judge Curlewis informed
journalists soon after the sermon.
Yet, here in the Western World, in Great Britain, in America and
in Australia, yes even here in Sydney, we have those who are
shamelessly teaching in our universities these same soul
destroying philosophies. I am not saying that such lecturers are
Communists but they are teaching .ideas which are breaking
down the restraints of conscience, decrying the institution of
marriage, urging our students to premarital sexual experience,
advocating free love and the right of self expression. Evidence
of this kind is even now before the New South Wales Advisory
Youth Policy Committee, recently appointed by the State
Government. I hope that in due course such publicity will be
given to this that the national conscience will be aroused. To
teach that there is no God and no Divine Law; to encourage self
16
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expression and free love; these throw the door wide open to
Communism. (p.5)
In Gough's hands, Devlin's general argument in support of the
enforcement of morals had become united with an anti-Communist
call for action to be taken to ensure that certain religious beliefs and
moral standards be maintained by academics, particularly in
Sydney.
The Archbishop's sermon did not end at this point. 'I may seem
to have wandered from the real subject of this address', he told the
congregation. The final section of the sermon consists in a return to
material about the relation 'between the Divine Law and Criminal
Law' in which he encouraged his legal hearers to 'Uphold the law
and do not give way to the popular clamour to relax its severity'
(p.5), presumably a protest against the movement for law reform in
England during the 1950s such as the Wolfenden Report. The
Archbishop also attempted to loosely relate the content of the
sermon to his text, Galatians 3:24: 'The Law was our schoolmaster
to bring us to Christ'. The fate of his sermon and his reputation did
not depend, however, upon the material he drew from Devlin or his
Cold War fears or his view of Christ's saving work, but his use and
endorsement of Or Kinsella's pamphlet.
11
In time, both Gough and Curlewis were to discover that Kinsella was
not the most reliable guide to affairs at the University in 1959, when
his pamphlet frrst appeared, or in 1961, when the Archbishop and
the Judge managed to give the author and his work a publicity they
could not otherwise have obtained. Judge Curlewis and his
Committee, however, had the opportunity of many months of
reflection and advice before having to determine the precise value
of Kinsella's submissions for their task. When the Committee
reported to the Minister in July, 1962, it said with respect to
Kinsella's Empiricism and Freedom and its claims about immoral
teaching:
After a very full consideration, the Committee came to the
conclusion that there was insufficient evidence that immoral
teaching had occurred. The Committee also considered that,
because of the wide publicity given to the allegations, the Senate
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of the University was in the most favourable position to make
such inquiries as it thought fit. 1
The Archbishop unlike the Committee, did not have much public
scope for reconsidering the pamphlet and its worth. That freedom
had all been but lost once he had preached his sermon. By drawing
upon the pamphlet and describing it as evidence, he had become
committed to its untested claims and identified as an establishment
figure encouraging a public request for authoritative action against
the atheistic and antinomian philosophers at Sydney University. It
was not long, however, before Gough came to realise, or, perhaps,
was forced to realise that he was in an untenable public position.2 In
a printed version of the sermon, published fourteen days after the
event in The Australian Church Record and separately printed in
pamphlet form for private circulation, the Archbishop conceded
something to his critics in a note printed at the bottom of the
sermon:
N.B. The evidence referred to on the previous page was partly a
pamphlet by Dr Kinsella which had been sent to His Honour
Judge Curlewis of the N.S.W. Youth Policy Advisory Committee.
I now understand that the accuracy of some of its allegations has
been denied. H. S. [Hugh Sydney] (ACR, 20/8, p.5).
As a concession to those whose reputations had been smeared by
the allegations referred to, this was not a generous admission, and
the mention of other evidence suggested that there was independent
material to support the Archbishop's claims.
What was this other evidence? The answer to this question was
provided by Gough's spokesman the day after the Convention
1 Report of the New South Wales Youth Policy Advisory Committee, p. 32.
2 In a letter, dated 21/7/61, from Dr Eric Dowling, then a lecturer in Philosophy
at the University of NSW to his former student, A. W. Sparkes, then studying
in London, Dowling writes: 'a youngster ... a member of the Sydney
Philosophy staff and an active communicant with the Church of England
solicited and obtained an hour's interview with His Grace in which HG said that
(a) he unconditionally withdrew everything based on the Kinsella pamphlet
and (b) that he'd like to make a public apology to Sydney University but that
(c) he could not because it would have to be so qualified, due to certain
reservations by which he still stood, that it would be incomprehensible and
misleading to the average member of the faithful.' I am indebted to Dr Dowling
for letting me quote from this letter and to my colleague, Dr Sparkes for
drawing it to my attention.
18
Ar~hbishop Gough and the Sydney Philosophers
sermon. It was material presented to the Archbishop's Moral
Welfare Committee appointed by him after his first diocesan synod
in 1959. At that synod concern had been expressed by one of the
assistant bishops, Bishop R. C. Kerle, about 'a growing "sex
hysteria" in Australia [which] was leading slowly to the
degeneratio~ of the moral tone of the community'. The synod
resolved that the matter be investigated by a committee of the
Archbishop's choosing, a motion which Gough welcomed as an
opportunity to do 'something to prevent these kinds of things
happening' (SMH, 25/9/59). In his presidential address to the 1960
synod, Gough reported that his Committee had found that 'sexual
impurity amongst married and unmarried young people and
children is a cancer which is eating at the very heart of this great
nation'.1 The Archbishop's spokesman explained the relevance of
this Committee to the attack in the Convention sermon:
Men of experience and standing in the community have given
other information on this matter to the Archbishop's Moral
Welfare Committee. Naturally the Archbishop cannot reveal
these sources. But the information was sufficient to convince the
Committee that the situation is serious. (DT, 8/7)
The Archbishop's Committee did not continue much beyond the
October, 1960 synod. With the appointment of the Curlewis
Committee in November of that year, it 'had been in abeyance' (8,
7/7), indicating that it was thought that its concerns would be better
served by the Government inquiry. The connection between the
work of the two committees, in the Archbishop's view, was further
confirmed by a report that
leading Anglicans who are in close touch with Dr Gough ...
believed that his attack [in his sermon] was designed to: Ensure
close study of the university question by Judge Curlewis's
committee. Urge his own informants to submit evidence to this
committee'. (DT, 8/7)
As the controversy over the Archbishop's attack developed, it
became clear, however, that neither he nor his informants were well
'Presidential Address', 17/10/60, Year Book of the Diocese of Sydney ...
196.1, Sydney, 1961, p. 222. The membership of the COIlfmittee included 'a
Judge of the Supreme Court, a Children's Court Magistrate, a Psychologist, a
Psychiatrist, a leading Educationist and Social Workers, both clerical and lay.'
(ibid.)
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placed to understand the complexities of the 'university question'
or the reliability of Dr Kinsella' s account of affairs at the
University. 1
III
Dr Kinsella, a Sydney medical graduate (1923, MD, 1947) was an
established surgeon, an honorary at St Vincent's, one of the
teaching hospitals for the University. He had a strong but narrowly
based interest in the social significance of philosophy which had
been furthered by association with the Aquinas Academy. The
Academy had been established in 1945 by the Catholic Archbishop
of Sydney, Dr Norman Gilroy, under the Regency of Dr Austin
Woodbury, a priest in the Marist order. Woodbury, a very well
qualified Thomistic philosopher and forceful teacher, exercised
considerable influence on several generations of Catholics who
wished for a philosophical education in accord with Church
teaching and independent of the tradition of philosophical
naturalism which had dominated University philosophy since the
arrival of John Anderson as Challis Professor of Philosophy in
1927.2
Anderson's empiricism was the main target of Kinsella's attack
in Empiricism and Freedom. Anderson is, he wrote, 'its chief
teacher' 'at our university' but Kinsella also aimed at the other
members of staff, those 'official teachers of our university' who
taught the same doctrines. In practical terms that ought not to have
been a difficult task, for during most of Anderson' s tenure of the
Why were Gough and Curlewis so concerned about the 'university question'?
The Archbishop had a particular concern about the changing mores of young
people from wealthy backgrounds (5MB, 24/10/60); the Curlewis Committee
regarded the universities as providing a leadership class (Report, p. 33).
2 On the founding of the Aquinas Academy, see CW, 25/1/45. The editor wrote:
'It might be encouraged, for example, that an arrangement might be reached
with the local university authorities whereby Catholic students for the Arts
Degree might complete their courses in philosophy in the Academy and receive
appropriate credit from the University. This would offset the unsatisfactory
philosophy taught by the clique that has gained control of philosophy at
Sydney University.' In 1961 the Academy had 600 students, (CW, 16/3). On Or
Woodbury, see CW, 15/2/45, 1/3/45, and T. L. Suttor, 'Austin Mary
Woodbury', The Australasian Catholic Record, 55, 1978, pp. 142-50. See also
'Who Put the Arsenic in the Chocolate?', in The Bulletin, 19/8/61; Patrick
O'Farrell, The Catholic Church and Community, rev. ed., Sydney, 1985, p.
409.
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Chair his department was staffed by his own former students and the
department became host to a philosophic school whose research
program was ideally to consist in developing a systematic and
comprehensive naturalistic metaphysic along the general lines set
out by Anderson in his early papers. This systematic philosophy
was known as empiricism or realism and sometimes as Andersonian
because of its distinctive doctrines.! The appointment in 1939 of A.
K. Stout from Edinburgh to the new Chair and department of Moral
and Political philosophy widened the opportunities for those
students who in their second and later years wished to specialise in
moral and political philosophy or who simply wished to escape
Anderson's department, now called the department of Logic and
Metaphysics. Stout, however, was a very different sort of
philosopher from Anderson in style, interests, and doctrine. He was
not driven by the wide ranging metaphysical ambitions that
motivated Anderson (or his own father, G. F. Stout, who
accompanied him to Australia) and his social and political concerns,
which involved him in many extra-university activities, tended to be
more constructively and less confrontationally expressed than
Anderson's. Philosophically, he was conscious of the influence of
his father's teaching upon his thought, a philosophy opposed to the
sort of naturalist metaphysic advocated by Anderson. Stout's
appointment, however, did little to change Anderson's actual and
perceived central place in philosophy at the University.2
Concerning Anderson's life and times, see D. Home, 'John Anderson', DT,
14/9/46; P. H. Partridge, 'Anderson as an Educator', The Australian Highway,
September 1958; A. J. Baker, op. cit.; Brian Kennedy, op. cit., and the E.
Kamenka (1986) and W. M. O'Neil (1979) items in his bibliography.
Kinsella's pamphlet: V. 1. Kinsella, Empiricism and Freedom, Sydney, [1959],
pp. 12, privately printed and distributed. (Item 901 in Stout papers). In some
copies there is a hand written addition on p. 1 indicating that he believed that,
what at Sydney is called empiricism, 'In other universities, the same is taught
under the name "logical positivism".' Anderson's school: J. A. Passmore
writes that 'He [Anderson] thought of the department as being rather like a
German Institute, in which we should all work out ideas that, as he granted, he
had only sketched.' (Memoirs of a Semi-detached Australian, Melbourne,
1977, p. 139.)
2 On A. K. Stout, see D. M. Armstrong, 'The late Emeritus Professor A. K.
Stout', Minutes of the Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney, 10 October 1983;
S. A. Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, St Lucia, 1984, pp. 89-90;
and the interview with Stout in DT, 19/7/47; J. A. Passmore, op. cit., pp. 142-
3. On G. F. Stout, see J. A. Passmore's 'Memoir' in G. F. Stout, God and
Nature, ed. A. K. Stout, Cambridge, 1952, and Passmore's op. cit., 1977, pp.
191-2.
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Amongst churchmen and social and political conservatives, the
interest Anderson generated amongst undergraduates and others
together with his forthright statements concerning various matters
caused much chagrin and, from time to time, vigorous public
protests. In such circles Stout's appointment was sometimes seen as
a disappointment. 'I have been told', the Bishop of Newcastle wrote
in 1943 to the Warden of 5t Paul's College, 'that the new
Professor's influence is negligible as against Professor Anderson'.1
The coalition of Anderson's extra-university critics resented his
atheism, his criticism of religion and clerical claims to moral
expertise, his rejection of conventional moral and political beliefs,
and, in the first decade of his tenure, his Communism, and later his
continuing admiration of aspects of Marx' s thought.
Kinsella's Empiricism and Freedom is the last expression of this
tradition of public opposition to Anderson and his influence, for by
the time the pamphlet was published its chief target had retired at
the end of 1958 as emeritus professor, and the two philosophy
departments which had existed from Stout's appointment were
reunited with two professors, Stout and J. L. Mackie, one of
Anderson's former students, who replaced him in the Challis Chair.
The significance of these and other changes, however, were lost on
Kinsella, in part because he thought Anderson's empiricist
philosophy still lingered on in the work of Stout and W. M. O'Neil,
Challis Professor of Psychology. They were, he believed,
Andersonians.
To be an Andersonian or Sydney University empiricist was for
Kinsella to be a member of a school which he describes as 'an
unwitting fifth column', 'hidden persuaders in such key posts at a
time so dangerous in our country and civilization' (p.9). The
Andersonian philosophy is 'as subtle as it is evil' (p.4), 'rubbish',
'devoid of strength and manliness, but contains the seeds of moral
corruption and political subversion' (p.12). Anderson' s department
was 'a Department for the De-education or Psycho-seduction of
children' (p.S).
The nature of the language, quite unlike that of Anderson' s
critics in the pages of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy or the
language of forceful criticism in scholarly journals, should, perhaps,
have alerted educated readers, even those who shared in one way or
another Kinsella's concerns, to the possibility that Empiricism and
Freedom was a knockabout piece of criticism whose claims needed
Bishop F. de Witt Batty to Canon A. H. Garnsey in David Garnsey, Arthur
Garnsey, Neutral Bay, NSW, 1985, p. 106. Batty goes on to write: 'I have also
been told that Anderson's own influence is well merited.'
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close checking. From KinseIla's point of view, however, the
language of abuse was justified because of the danger that a false
philosophy posed to social well being. 'Ideas', he wrote, 'are the
mighty viewless winds which account for the movement of history'
(p.!). And, like Gough two years later, he illustrated this view with
reference to claims about the role of nineteenth century German
thought - Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche - in the decline of
Germany into Nazism. It is also likely that his unguarded language
was in part politically oriented as he hoped that his pamphlet would
directly or indirectly force the University Senate to do something
about the Andersonians and their influence.
It [the Senate] should explain why empiricism is the chosen
teaching of our university and why monopoly rights have been
afforded to it, and why the more noble disciplines of philosophy
have been excluded. (p.12)
To achieve the ends of warning his readers and encouraging the
Senate to act, it was necessary, however, to justify his claims by
critically outlining Anderson's position and showing how Stout and
O'Neil applied such views.
Anderson's empiricist philosophy, Kinsella claimed is 'a form
of sensism and of materialism'; 'He admits only the material things
which occur in space and time, and which impress his sense organs
and can be weighed or measured by some experimental means'
(p.2). The consequence of this position is that Anderson rejects the
(Aristotelian-Thomistic) doctrine of natures with disastrous results
for moral and legal theory and natural theology. The doctrine of
natures is that substances are made what they are by a formal
principle, the essence, which determines in each individual substance
its type or kind and thereby provides its identity and determines the
field of its range of operations and changes. Anderson has to reject
this metaphysical doctrine, according to Kinsella, because the only
source of knowledge he allows is what the sense organs provide and
the senses cannot reveal to us the structural principles upon which
the world we experience through them is based. The distinction
between man and brute in Anderson's philosophy is said to be
effectively denied because human knowledge is restricted to what a
brute, lacking intellect, can discover. 'It has been rightly said of
empiricism', Kinsella claimed, 'that it is the philosophy of the
gutter, for it admits only sense-knowing -peering, sniffing, nosing,
cocking the ears, etc' (p.5). A correct philosophy, a common-sense
philosophy, he asserted, knows that human beings have 'different
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knowing powers, viz., senses and intellect' and can know more than
sense reveals.
The possession of the intellectual or immaterial manner of
knowing distinguishes man from the brute. As consequences,
man enjoys speech, progress, arts, sciences, law, religion,
literature, virtues and vices, laughter and tears. The explanation
of these higher things is beyond empiricism. (p.4)
Kinsella then proceeds to show in a little more detail the disastrous
consequences that follow from the Andersonian rejection of a
doctrine of natures.
In moral theory, 'the empiricist must reject the natural moral
law' (p.3) which is a general expression of the conduct that is
morally appropriate for a being possessed of a human nature
endowed with reason and free will. The only moral theory open to
the empiricist is moral subjectivism: 'For them, there remains only
subjectivism in morals. The act is good provided that you feel like
it' (p.6). The effect of this theory upon the source of law, Kinsella
claimed, is to remove its rational moral foundation. Law can then
only be based upon will, upon what is pursued rather than what is
rightly to be pursued, thereby leaving society legally vulnerable to
the rule of the strongest. 'Empiricism thus throws the doors wide
open to totalitarianism and tyranny' (p.9). Theologically,
empiricism destroys natural theology and thereby removes the basis
which enables divine revelation to be recognised as such. The
reason is that sense experience provides no evidence of the
distinctive causal bond which links an effect to its cause, with the
result that 'We cannot conclude from the cosmos to the Creator'
(p.9). The empiricist, (unlike the Aristotelian and common sense) is
reduced to treating causation as mere regular succession. l
The role of Stout and O'Neil and other 'university empiricists'
in Kinsella's account is largely to illustrate the way in which
Anderson's doctrines are applied. Stout is accused of advocating
trial marriages in a 1958 television program, 'Any Questions?',
which Kinsella regarded as a consistent but shameful application of
the empiricist position in morals. A letter written to The Sydney
Morning Herald (22/4/55) concerning the Obscene Publications Act
in which 'university empiricists' asserted that 'moral values cannot
'For him [Anderson] there is no difference between caused-succession, e.g.,
lightning and thunder, and uncaused-succession, e.g., my breakfast egg and the
subsequent delivery of the morning mail by the postman. Empiricists are not
as other men.' (p. 5).
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be assessed objectively' (p.6) shows the same moral subjectivism in
action. Stout's claim, in another letter to The Sydney Morning
Herald (1/7/58) that the moral philosopher's task qua moral
philosopher is to analyse moral concepts and claims but not to
advocate particular moral positions or courses of action is held to be
inconsistent with his behaviour on television and, more importantly,
it is taken to show how empiricists seek to avoid responsibility for
settling the matters they claim to investigate: 'they resort to the
mean and pusillanimous device of sophisticating the truth (implying
that "critical study" and "advocate" are mutually exclusive), then
shrinking from judgment and refusing to advocate' (p.S).
Anderson's view, expressed in relation to the issues raised in the Orr
case at the University of Tasmania, that a university lecturer's sexual
relationship with one of his students is not necessarily a ground for
dismissal since the teaching and examining relationship might well
be unaffected, is taken to show an indifference to the teacher's
moral responsibility for his students. O'Neil, long suspect as an
Andersonian in certain Catholic circles, is said to have 'showed one
of their favourite instruments of deception, the suppressing of the
true and suggesting of the false' (p.ll), because he had linked
Anderson's name with Socrates in the report (SMH, 31/12/58) of a
retirement farewell at the University in 1958. Nothing, Kinsella
claimed, could be further from the truth: 'Socrates, unlike
Anderson, had maintained ideals and ultimates and objective
morality, and by teaching and example had advocated and urged
youth to the Rractice of virtue, as Xenophon and Plato relate'
(p.ll ).1
To philosophically untrained readers, hostile about what they
knew or feared about Anderson and his influence, Kinsella's angry
paper might well have seemed authoritative if somewhat obscure.
Criticus, a colu~ist in The Catholic Weekly (30/4/59) welcomed its
appearance: 'it hits hard', he reported, but 'is timely and
provocative. It is to be hoped it brings results and a change for the
better'. The problem with this view, however, is that Kinsella was
wrong in a nu~ber of significant details.
J. Anderson, 'The Orr Case and Academic Freedom', in The Observer, 28/6/58.
Anderson would have had in mind his affair with his student and colleague,
Ruth Walker. See Brian Kennedy, op. cit. In her retirement Ruth Walker made a
generous donation to the University of Newcastle Philosophy Club for the
publication of Andersoniana in its magazine, Dialectic. Concerning O'Neil:
see CW, 26/7/45 where he, the recently appointed Professor of Psychology, is
criticised for his allegedly 'prompt readiness to fall into line with Professor
Anderson and advocate similar causes.'
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Anderson's distinctive empiricist philosophy is not a version of
sensism, i.e., sensationalism, a view which he specifically rejected;
his materialism amounts to the claim that mind and all that is, is
spatio-temporal and governed by the general categories of
existence, especially causation, not that mind is to be reduced to
matter; his ethical and aesthetic views were objectivist, not
subjectivist: goodness is a natural quality found in certain states of
mind and social movements just as beauty, another natural quality,
is found in certain works of art and aspects of nature; causality is
not to be reduced to mere succession or certain regular forms of
succession, as Hume had done, nor is it to be explained in terms of
essences or natures, bQt rather it is a di~tinctive category or pervasive
feature of all things or situations as both causing and being caused
and which, in principle, can be observed in particular situations.!
KinselIa's study of Anderson's writings was very restricted and
not well informed. To his own and his readers' disadvantage he
overlooked the writings of prominent members of Anderson' s
school such as J. A. Passmore's Ralph Cudworth (1951) and
Hume's Intentions (1952) which helped to explain and to bring out
the distinctiveness of Anderson's philosophy in comparison with
other positions. Where he was right, however, was in seeing that
Anderson was opposed to any ethics of a deontological kind
thereby dismissing the distinctive ethical authority of traditional
moral prohibitions. This did not mean that such traditional
prohibitions are to be disregarded though it did mean that there are
no moral reasons why they should be observed. In time, after the
controversy following Gough's sermon, Kinsella came to see this:
Anderson's philosophy was then seen as covertly recommending
immoral practices, a view which in relation to sexual behaviour
fitted a not uncommon perception.2
The fullest exposition of Anderson's philosophy is provided in A. J. Baker's
Anderson's Social Philosophy, Sydney, 1979, and Australian Realism: The
Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson, Cambridge, 1986. The
bibliography in Brian Kennedy, Ope cit. should be consulted.
2 See, e.g., the review of Owen Kelly's novel, There is No Refuge, Nation,
29/7/61; D. Wetherell and C. Carr-Greg, Camilia: C. W. Wedgwood 1901-
1955, Sydney, 1990, pp. 131-2. Covert teaching: Onlooker, a columnist in
The Sun Herald (23/7) writes that Or Kinsella 'asks me to say that he has
"certain proof' that free love is still being advocated "covertly and
implicitly." As he puts it, "the arsenic is administered, not neat but concealed
in chocolates.'" See also TS, 12/7.
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Kinsella was also mistaken about persons. Stout was no
Andersonian, as he explained in a letter l to Curlewis's Committee in
1961: 'my main philosophical views were already formed [on
taking the Sydney chair], largely under the influence of my father,
the late Professor G. F. Stout' (HS, 14/7). The claim that he had
advocated trial marriages was based on a mistaken newspaper report
in The Daily Telegraph (8/8/58) of an Any Questions program on
television in which he had played 'devil's advocate' when no other
member of the panel felt able to put up a case. O'Neil, a very
philosophically minded psychologist, was also wrongly identified
by Kinsella as one of Anderson' s disciples, particularly as
understood by Kinsella, but he acknowledged the influence of
Anderson on his thought: 'I do, of course, owe a great intellectual
debt to him, just as I do to other men in philosophy, psychology
and physiology' (HS, 27/3/63). Perhaps the most revealing error
was the claim that the 1955 letter to the Sydney Morning Herald
protesting the Obscene Publications Act was the work of 'university
empiricists'. Anderson, Stout and O'Neil had signed the letter along
with twenty eight other professors and forty nine senior lecturers
from across the University, though as it happened Anderson signed
the letter to help the protest against the Act despite his objectivist
dislike 'of the view that moral values cannot be assessed
objectively'. On Kinsella's reading of the situation there must have
been many unaware Andersonians in the senior ranks of the
University, but as Anderson pointed out, most of the signatories
'must have known little or nothing about empiricism' (HS, 27/7).
Kinsella's method of understanding Anderson and his influence
was to take anything which he regarded as Andersonian and to
make Andersonians of those Sydney academics who maintained
such things. Even so he missed the one target, the Libertarian
Society, which would have provided him with useful but limited
material for his cause. This voluntary society of students and staff,
founded after the break-up of Anderson's Freethought Society in
1951, was both influenced and rejected by Anderson. The
Stout's six and a half page letter, date 10/7, to the Curlewis Committee was
cyclostyled and distributed in the University and later printed in Honi Soit,
14/7. The letter is item 872 (2) in the Stout Papers; 872 (1) is Curlewis's
invitation (date 7/7) to Stout to appear before or write to the Committee, with
an assurance that the Committee had as yet no position on the Kinsella
pamphlet. Stout was unimpressed by this claim, as he indicated in a note on the
invitation, since he held that Curlewis had passed the document onto Gough as
something he might use in his sermon. See also A. K. Stout, 'The Archbishop
and the Philosophers', in Vestes, 4 (3), Sept.,19(j1, p. 35, fn.
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University Libertarians opposed the authority of the state and the
churches and other bodies which they took to be authoritarian and
encouraged, as their student secretary, George Molnar, wrote, a life
free of conformity to the 'illusions of virginity, chastity, the sanctity
of marriage and of the family' (BS, 4/3/57).1
When Empiricism and Freedom first appeared in 1959, Stout, of
those named in it, was particularly upset by the attack. He and
Anderson, however, decided to do nothing about it because the
advice they received was that 'no responsible person would pay any
serious attention to the pamphlet or be influenced by it' (HS, 13/7).
Stout was particularly buoyed up by a letter at the time from Dr
John Bumheim, Rector of St John's, the Catholic College at the
University, commiserating with him about the pamphlet and
advising that he thought it 'garbled and intemperate' and would
'soon be consigned to oblivion' (HS, 13/7). Shortly after
Bumheim's letter, the Catholic Chaplain to the Newman Society,
Roger Pryke, wrote to The Catholic Weekly (7/5/59).2 In his letter
dissenting from Criticus's earlier welcome of the pamphlet, he
expressed his regret that the pamphlet had been published,
defended Stout's reputation over the trial marriage issue, protested
at Kinsella's 'emotive language', and warned of the dangers
involved in asking the Senate 'to legislate, more or less, what
philosophical positions should be taught'.
Amongst close observers of University philosophy in 1959,
Kinsella was seen as an aggressive and uninformed dabbler. He had
learnt the rudiments of one philosophical system but was
unsuspecting of its difficulties and insensitive to the details and
strengths of its rivals. His philosophical scholarship was weak, his
approach to philosophy, ideological and political. None of this,
however, was known to Archbishop Gough, nor it seems to those
upon whom he relied for advice. They all were, as the Vice-
Freethought and Libertarian Societies: see D. M. McCallum, 'Anderson and
Freethought', in The Australian Highway, September, 1958; A. J. Baker,
'Introduction' and 'Sydney Libertarianism', in The Sydney Line: A Selection of
Libertarian Comments and Criticism, Sydney, 1963; Libertarian 1, 1957, 2,
1958, 3, 1960; A. 1. Baker, Anderson's Social Philosophy, pt. 11, esp. pp.
130-6, 144. In Libertarian 1, 1957, 'An Open Letter to Libertarians' from
Wellwisher of Turramurra is reconstructed from student notes of a fourth year
seminar given by Anderson outlining his objections to the Libertarian
position; the reply is by D. 1. Ivison; Judy Ogilvie, The Push, Sydney, 1995;
and Anne Coombs, Sex and Anarchy, Ringwood, 1996.
2 Bumheim's letter is in the Stout Papers attached to item 872 (2); a copy of
Pryke's letter, items 902, 903.
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Chancellor of the University of Melbourne was later to say of
Gough, 'completely out of touch' (SMH, 7/7).
IV
One week after the Archbishop's ser~on, The Anglican (14/7),
whose managing director was Francis James, carried the headlines:
'Archbishop Attacks University - Nation Wide Reaction by Clergy
and Academics'. Remarkably for a national church newspaper, The
Anglican set out to publicise the Primat~'s troubles i~ painful detail,
and published an editorial to match. A day by d~y diary of the
course of the controversy up to the time of printing was provided
on the front and the back pages of the paper. On the front page,
James reported that
His Grace's words have touched off a nation-wide controversy,
in which university teachers and administrators and the clergy of
several denominations are now taking part. All the university
men and all the clergy, save one, have differed from the
Archbishop.
There were three types of prompt critical reaction to Gough's
claims about the Sydney and other philosophers. One came from
Vice-Chancellors anxious to protect the reputations of their staffs
and the independence of their universities, as far as politically
possible, from outside interference. Sydney's Sir Stephen Roberts
said that 'while reluctant to contradict' the Archbishop, 'I must do
so in this case. I doubt if the archbishop can produce the facts to
substantiate his outrageous charges' (SMH, 7/7). Later he was to
lose whatever reluctance he felt about contradicting Gough. He is
reported to have sent a message to him 'somewhat as follows: "Let
the Archbishop continue with his accusations and face the law of
libel. '" 1
Other early critics included those who had a knowledge of the
University scene and supported the l~beral ideals of the secular
university tradition. Amongst these was a group of academics at the
University of Melbourne organised by D. M. Armstrong who spoke
out forcefully in defence of the personal characters of Anderson,
1 D. R. V. Wood, Stephen Henry Roberts, Sydney, 1986, p. 87; see p. 92, n. 26.
In his letter to the Curlewis Committee Stout said that on the rust appearance .
of the Kinsella document he had received legal advice that he had grounds for an
action of defamation against Kinsella. (HS, 13/7).
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Stout and O'Neil, and the success of Anderson's opposition to
Communist ideas at the University of Sydney. They were also
strong in defence of academic freedom against Gough's attempt to
enforce certain beliefs upon the university community:
It is our conviction that a university lecturer has the right to hold
and say that there is or that there is no divine law and that he is
entitled to adopt a critical attitude to prevailing sexual mores as
well as to defend them. (SMH, 10/7)
The most striking defender of the liberal character of the secular
university was, however, Stuart Barton Babbage, Dean of St Paul's
Cathedral, Melbourne, and recently Dean of St. Andrew's, Sydney.
Babbage was strongly opposed to any attempt to restrain freedom
of expression within universities. It would be, he said, 'an alarming
state of affairs if, in a university, a man was forbidden to speak the
truth as he saw it. If freedom of speech is forbidden, the next step is
the rubber truncheon and the concentration camp. I cannot fairly
claim the right to freedom of speech for myself without at the same
time conceding the same to others' (TA, 14/7). Babbage also
suggested that the Archbishop had confused the Libertarian Society
with the work of the Department of Philosophy.!
Whether or not this was true, other well placed commentators
also made the point that the Archbishop was mistaken in his claims.
Felix Arnott, Warden of St Paul's, the Anglican College within the
University, gave support to the philosophers which Stout, in
particular, appreciated. In two separate responses Arnott, the most
senior Sydney Anglican to take part in the controversy, said:
I think it is an excellent department. The Archbishop's
statement was based on claims made two years ago, and even so I
think it was grossly uninformed (SMH, 8/7). I know of no case
of students being encouraged in any way by university staff to
commit immoral acts or indulge in an immoral way of life. (DT,
8/7)
1 See also DT, 10/7; Stuart Barton Babbage, Sex and Sanity, London, 1965;
'Education and Ecstasy', in Journal of Christian Education, Papers 55, May
1976; 'Four Kinds of Persons', in The Australian University, 14, 1976.
30
Archbishop Gough and the Sydney Philosophers
The heads of Women's College (Miss D. Langley) and St Andrew's
(the Rev. A. Dougan), the Presbyterian College, also gave their
support to the philosophers, in the same newspaper reports.!
The third type of response to the sermon was that of those
named in Kinsella's pamphlet. There were two common elements in
their individual rejoinders. First, each claimed that he had never
taught students to engage in free love and so on. 'In my 32 years at
Sydney University', Anderson said, 'I never heard a philosophy
teacher advocate free love or pre-marital experience in the lecture-
room. What he expresses in private is his own business, and not the
Archbishop's or Dr Kinsella's' (S, 7/7). Stout and O'Neil made
similar claims (SM H, 8/7). Secondly, each man expressed
amazement that Gough had been prepared to give public credence
to Kinsella's pamphlet. 'A man with the training in the Humanities
that one ordinarily expects in senior Anglican churchmen', O'Neil
told The Anglican (14/7), 'should readily have seen that Dr Kinsella
has the strangest view of what philosophy is and what University
teachers should do'. Stout told the Curlewis Committee: 'I am still
to understand how the Primate of Australia or any other person of
intelligence could regard this pamphlet as serious argument, or how
indeed his Grace could dignify it with the title of evidence at all'
(HS, 13/7). Anderson was even more contemptuous; 'It is a
disgrace that a person like Dr Gough couldn't see straight away that
Dr Kinsella's pamphlet is illiterate stuff (DT, 8/7). They expressed,
from an aggrieved position, a puzzlement which others sympathetic
to the Archbishop's aims resolved in his favour. 2
Beyond these points of similarity, the three academics followed
different agendas in their response to Gough. O'Neil pointed out
that he was targeted out of a combination of ignorance and
prejudice (TA, 14/7). Anderson and Stout, differed, in accord to
some extent with their situations and views. Anderson, who had
become a legend in his lifetime, was now a professor emeritus with a
long history of confrontation with powerful critics outside the
University. Stout, no less determined, was the professorial head of
the University's Department of Philosophy, and a respected
intellectual contributor to many causes outside the University.
As the Anglican academic, R. G. Tanner wrote: 'He [the Archbishop] has
chosen not to seek the advice of such people [Anglican and other Christian
academics] and must not be disappointed if they repudiate his policy.' (TA,
21/7).
2 The Catholic apologist, Dr Rumble MSC handles the matter sympathetically,
CW, 17/8; Francis lames (?), unsympathetically in an editorial, TA, 14/7.
31
This Immense Panorama: Studies in Honour of Eric J. Sharpe
For Anderson, the controversy provided a further and welcome
opportunity to battle once again on behalf of the autonomous
secular university against interference in its life and work from
religious and other non-academic interests. 'This thing boils up
every now and then. I am glad it has again because it gives us an
opportunity to say things that must be said' (8MB, 11/7). In lectures
at three university centres Anderson argued that the secular
character of universities faced a positive threat from religious
interests. Religion, church doctrine and practice, had no proper
place in the life of the university community:
The immediate occasion of the present controversy should
remind us of the constant endeavour of the clerical forces to
encroach on work which is essentially secular and which, more
particularly, is marked by a rigour which clerics cannot
approach. (HS, 27/7)
The secular university, a university free of church control and
sectarian intervention, is on this view a secularist university, a
university which is to operate in accord with a secularist philosophy.
'In any university', Anderson said, 'the fight between secularism
and religion is intense' (SMB, 21/7).
But why should the secular university be secularist? In an earlier
1943 controversy about religion in school education, Anderson's
answer had been that education requires that the matters to be
taught and learnt are such as are open to question and able to be
investigated by 'observation and experiment - these are the
universal educational methods'. Religious or sacred objects are
typically thought to be beyond question and are not open to
observation. The result is that 'religion and education are opposed';
'education is necessarily secular'. 1 In his 1961 public lectures
'Religion and Education', in J. Anderson, Education and Inquiry, ed. D. Z.
Phillips Oxford, 1980, p. 203. This paper was Anderson's contribution to
Religion in Education, New Education Fellowship, July 1943; a record of the
controversy surrounding Anderson' s remarks is printed in an Appendix. See A.
1. Baker, Anderson's Social Philosophy, pp. 118-22. Why did Anderson not
take the same line in 1961? The answer might relate in part to Gilbert Ryle's
criticism that Anderson mistakenly treats philosophy as if it were not different
from the sciences: 'Not one of his articles contains, so far as I can see, the
reports of any experiments... ' ('Logic and Professor Anderson', in
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 28, 1950, p. 153.) Also, though this is
unlikely, his awareness that his doctrine of Space and Time was 'unspeakable'
in terms of other requirements of his system, as happens with Plato's Form of
the Good, Plotinus' s One and Aquinas' s God, might have played a part.
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Anderson does not take this line on religion in the university.
Rather the case for a secularist view of the university is based on the
opposition between philosophy and religion understood as
theology. 'If you are going to get anywhere', he told a Newcastle
audience, 'you must get rid of one or the other' (TA, 11/8). The
'whole trend of modern philosophy', Anderson claimed to Sydney
students, 'has been anti-religious (or, more specifically anti-
Christian), and the same can be said of the philosophy of to-day'
(HS, 27/7). This conflict is said to turn on whether a theory of
reality is to be constructed in personal terms in which a deity is
regarded as central to the nature of reality or an impersonal view as
in philosophy where the aim is 'to discover the forms of
connections between things, e.g., how they are caused or brought
about' (HS, 27/7), which is, in Anderson's view, a theory of the
categorial or pervasive features which mark all spatio-temporal
occurrences. The importance of the choice between the two
approaches for the university is that 'In a university every subject
coalesces with philosophy or is related to it in some way' (TA, 11/8).
But Anderson argued the choice between a theological or anti-
theological approach to philosophy is fairly straightforward since
the religious position is confused and groundless: 'It is all empty
phrases, does not add to knowledge, and has no evidence to show a
connection between the ultimate Being and dependent reality'
(Newcastle Morning Herald, 5/8).
The case for a secularist understanding of the university is also
supported by way in which religious believers present fairy tales as
if they are true, which goes to show how far the religiously minded
'are from reality' (HS, 27/7). The proper approach to religion in a
university is to disregard the fairy tales and the confused
phllosophy of theology and to reveal the secular, non-divine,
human problems which are expressed in a hidden and mixed way in
religious stories and doctrines. 'Historically', Anderson claimed, 'it
was from human and social relations that religious issues arose; or
as Feuerbach put it, the real content of "the divine" is the human'
(HS, 27/7)
In developing his views about the secularist character of the
secular university, Anderson also had to defend his school-approach
to the work of philosophers in the university. This had been a point
of criticism in Kinsella's appeal to the University Senate, and it had
Anderson's reply to Ryle is in his Studies in Empirical Philosophy, A. K.
Stout, ed., Sydney, 1962, esp., pp. 183 ff; on the unspeakability of Space and
Time, see A. J. Baker, Australian Realism, pp. 106-9.
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long been a matter of concern to theologically minded observers,
particularly those who had experience of other philosophy
departments. It was also a matter of concern to some of those who
had defended the Sydney philosophers against Gough's attack and
yet were convinced that Anderson's approach to education in a
thoroughly speculative subject restricted students' educational
opportunities far too much in favour of his own philosophy. 'The
purpose of teaching philosophy', one well placed clerical critic
wrote, 'is surely not to inculcate particular views, but to train
students to think for themselves about philosophical issues'.1 The
present post-Anderson department with its 'reasonable variety of
viewpoints', was, he believed, well situated for this purpose' (8MB,
14/7). For Anderson, this sort of criticism was pedagogically
uninformed: 'A strong central position is necessary from which to
work - otherwise he [the student] only adds his scraps of knowledge
to the bundle of scraps offered to him, and such a collection of
odds and ends is not a body of learning' (HS, 14/7).
Many of those who teach speculative subjects such as philosophy
and theology would agree that a clear method must be followed in
organising, expounding, and criticising the material in lectures.
Does it, however, have to be a method deeply embedded in a
systematic viewpoint and common to all members of a department?
This was one of the points on which Stout and Anderson disagreed.
Stout's small Department of Moral and Political Philosophy had
never been host to a single school of philosophic thought. The
union of the two Departments upon Anderson's retirement meant
that the Department of which Stout was the professorial head was
not only more diverse as a result of administrative union but
became even more so with new appointments from a variety of
backgrounds. 'The department contained persons of various
religious and philosophical views', he told the N.S.W. Humanist
Society, 'and there was frequent disagreement between them'
(SMH, 19/8). It was a point Stout emphasised in his letter to the
Curlewis Committee (HS, 13/7) and in the letter column of The
Sydney Morning Herald (14/7). The philosophers, however, were
generally opposed to the view that securing a balance of viewpoints
should be a mandatory policy for departments, as recommended by
an editorial in The Sydney Morning Herald (15/7), confident that a
1 The Rev. Dr J. Haultain Brown of St Andrew's College at the University,
secretary of the Presbyterian Church's Faculty of Theology.
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policy of appointing the best academically qualified candidates for
positions would produce philosophic diversity within departments. 1
Another area of disagreement between Anderson and Stout was
on the question whether to respond to the Curlewis Committee
which was going to consider the Kinsella pamphlet which had been
tendered as evidence for its consideration on youth welfare. Should
the University or its members seek to defend themselves before such
a Committee? Anderson's answer was no. His view was that the
University through its established academic procedures is its own
arbiter of academic matters, not outside non-academic bodies. 'It is
the University itself', he argued, 'which maintains academic
independence and makes decisions on academic grounds, not for
example, on utilitarian or on ecclesiastical grounds. It is a mistake,
then, for members of the University to offer evidence to the
Curlewis Committee' (HS, 27/7). By the time Anderson had
expressed this view to a packed meeting at the University, Stout had
written a detailed submission to the Curlewis Committee. In it he
attacked Kinsella's pamphlet with 'its defamatory statements about
Professor Anderson, Professor O'Neil, and myself, expressed his
concern that the Archbishop should endorse such a document,
explained his own position on various matters including the
television program on trial-marriages, and the fact that he was not
an Andersonian. He also stated his admiration for Anderson as a
philosopher and a teacher of high ideals, and outlined Kinsella' s
errors about Anderson' s philosophy and its influence. 'The
Committee can hardly expect me and will not want me', he wrote,
'to try to re-state in a few words Anderson' s philosophy so as to
rescue it from the farrago of nonsense that Dr Kinsella makes of it.
And', he wryly added, 'Professor Anderson would not thank me for
trying to do so' (HS, 13/7).
See A. K. Stout, SMH, 14/7 where he pointed out that the courses and the
textbooks at the University were common to Australian and British
universities; J. B. Thomton, Professor of Philosophy at the University of
NSW, SMH, 18/7, more Andersonian in approach - 'philosophy does not any
more than chemistry consist of viewpoints' - insisting that academic criteria
should be the only measure for appointments. Len Goddard, Professor of
Philosophy at the University of New England, unpublished paper, 'The
Philosopher and Society' (Stout Papers 897 (2)), departments should encourage
a variety of views amongst staff; J. L. Mackie, 'Philosophy - Its Place in the
Universities', in Vestes, 14, (3), Sept., 1961, p. 43, 'the market place of
appointments on academic criteria will ensure diversity'. Only Goddard
discussed the problem of human frailty in such matters. Cf. J. M. Fahey SJ
'Academic Freedom', in Twentieth Century, Spring 1961, pp. 28-31.
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Later Stout was to express misgivings about having written,
perhaps because of Anderson' s views about the autonomy of the
secular university.! But whatever the strength of university claims to
autonomy because of its role as the general provider of the higher
professional skills and the disinterested conserver and source of
advanced knowledge, it is a state recognised and funded self-
regulating institution and not a complete law unto itself. In the
Gough controversy or controversies the dependence of the
university on the community was a point made by a number of
churchmen, friend and foe. It was most forcefully argued by J. M.
Fahey SI, a theologian attached to the Jesuit Institute for Social
Order in Melbourne. Australian universities, he argued, 'are semi-
autonomous governmental bodies, supported by the State, that is, by
the tax-payer, and having a privileged position in law because they
have a community function to perform'. Academic freedom, he
maintained, is essential for the university if it is to fulfil its
community function, but the university is not the only arbiter of its
adequacy in this regard. The claim to academic freedom by staff
'who think of themselves as modem Socrates on superannuation'
and others is not absolute but conditional, though properly
honoured within the community and rarely challenged. Philosophy,
however, provides the central ~nd most difficult problem. There is
no easy solution to the tensions it creates: 'It is probably true that
there can be no way of teaching philosophy which will satisfy the
teachers and the community'. The best compromise, Fahey argued,
is to appoint staff not because of their views but because of their
competence in 'a common technique of philosophizing' as, he says,
is now done in Melbourne and Sydney. 'It is because of the
number of instructors and the variety of opinion that the
community can be satisfied with this compromise'.2
What of the other side, those who were for Dr Gough? While the
Sydney philosophers found allies in a number of quarters, the
Archbishop was not so fortunate. At the beginning of the
controversy he received unquestioning support from The Sun, an
evening paper, and later critical but encouraging support from The
Sydney Morning Herald, both Fairfax papers, whose proprietor, Sir
Warwick Fairfax, had a long standing interest in philosophy and
religion and a critical attitude towards Anderson' s dominance of
A. K. Stout, 'The Archbishop and the Philosophers', in Vestes, 4 (3),
Sept.,1961, p. 35, fn.
2 John M. Fahey, 'Academic Freedom', in Twentieth Century, Spring, 1961, p.
26; p. 29; p. 28; p. 29; p. 29; p. 30.
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University philosophy.1 Gough's main clerical supporter was the
Rev. Gordon Powell, minister of 5t 5tephen's Presbyterian Church
in the city. Powell was not concerned with drawing distinctions
between the influence of the Philosophy Department and the
activities of staff in voluntary groups such as the Libertarian and
earlier Freethought societies. His criticism was based on first hand
and anecdotal evidence that some, perhaps many of those who had
come into contact with Anderson's philosophy, had come to reject
both Christian faith and accepted moral practice. Staff who brought
about such results in their students whether inside or outside the
lecture room were not in his view fit to hold their positions2:
I don't think it matters whether professors express their thoughts
on marriage and sex in the lecture room, on television, or in
private. If they have these beliefs that can only corrupt morals
they should not be holding positions in which they can
influence young people. Sydney today is littered with
Sir Warwick Fairfax listed philosophy amongst his recreations in his entry in
Who's Who in Australia. See, particularly his column 'Casual Converse,'
5MB, 27/3/49, and 3/4/49, and his book, The Triple Abyss, London, 1965.
See Peter Coleman, Ope cit., pp. 159 ff. Editorials in SMH were critical of the
Gough synods of 1959 (26/9/59) and 1960 (19/10/60). In the editorial
Archbishop Gough and the Philosophers (15/7), Gough was criticised for his
'more excessive criticisms', his 'exaggerations', his 'calling for Government
action' but commended for being one of a 'courageous kind.' The philosophers
were criticised for a readiness to assail him simply for speaking out and
because they had not maintained a balance of teaching at the University by
providing for 'the rightful place of non-empirical philosophy', a balance
which should be ensured by 'university administrators'.
2 There is an account of Gordon Powell's Sydney ministry in G. W. Hardy,
Living Stones, Homebush West, NSW, 1985, ch.8. Powell wrote to Stout
(Stout Papers, 891 (1» including the full statement he made in support of
Gough on 9/7, which was printed in The NSW Presbyterian, 1118. Powell's
ignoring of the distinction between what was publicly taught or held in class
and what was not, had a curious parallel in the views of some of the
philosophers about the controversy. In Dr Eric Dowling's letter to A. W.
Sparkes - see n.ll - Dowling writes: 'The cream of it is that David Stove
(Sydney) and I are supporting Gough and charging Stout with dishonesty
(which makes Stout very angry) - our line being that what Gough & company
mean by "immorality" is just fornication & adultery and that it is true that
"empiricism" does in fact "encourage" these activities & in historical fact has
done so in Sydney University, but that this is defensible and that if you're not
going to admit the deed but deny the guilt then you ought to say nothing at all
(which would probably be best in view of the average I.Q.).'
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intellectuals without any faith because of the techniques of one
professor and his followers. (8, 10/7)
The N.S.W. Council of Churches, of which the Archbishop was the
honorary chairman, came out in a swingeing attack on the
academics who had criticised Gough, the abuse of academic
freedom, the failure of the Government to appoint church
representatives to the Curlewis Committee, and the secularism of the
University in failing to provide a Faculty of Divinity to counter anti-
Christian teaching (SMB, 19/7). This and Powell's attacks provided
weak support for the Archbishop because they were soon called into
question by their natural allies. The Presbyterian Church, which had
a strong reputation for a scholarly ministry, had no desire to be
associated with Powell' s attack. Furthermore the Presbyterians and
some of the other churches in the N.S.W. Council resented the
failure of the Council President and Secretary to consult with the
constituent member churches before publishing their criticism, and
there were threats of withdrawal (8MH, 21/7) The reputation of the
Council was also not helped by Sir Stephen Roberts' description of
the Council statement as 'a tarradiddle of verbose frustration',
pointing out that the University already had a Board of Studies in
Divinity which was poorly patronised by students, all of whom had
their fees refunded by the University in an effort to encourage use
of the facility (8M H, 9/7) The Government, which, like the
University, was said to be secularist in spirit, responded that it was up
to the Curlewis Committee, if it wished, to recommend a church
representative for appointment.
Significantly, The Catholic Weekly did not come out directly in
support of Gough's charges. The editorial in the 27 July issue,
however, attacked soul-less, godless, immoral philosophies without
mentioning names. Morality, the editor argued, can exist only if
human beings possess rational, immortal souls created by God.
Denial of God's existence by 'some person or some group' does
not change the nature and basis of the moral domain or its central
place in the life of a Christian country such as Australia.
In this sense it is good to remind ourselves that whilst ever we
claim the name of being a Christian country every freedom has
its restrictions - that it is limited to liberty of expression that will
not undermine Christian tenets and the morality they imply.
Christianity has not only the duty to expect that its teachings will
be defended: it has the right to insist that they are.
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It appears that the criticisms of Burnheim and Pryke protected The
Catholic Weekly from linking its sympathy with the general thrust
of the Archbishop's criticism to any suggestion of support for
Kinsella's document. This caution, however, was not due to any lack
of sympathy for Kinsella's aim in attacking Anderson and his
influence. Once the chance came to fire upon Anderson on
seemingly uncontestable grounds, Catholic authority spoke forth.
Anderson's university addresses provided the opportunity. Bishop
Muldoon then launched an attack on his 'pernicious and soul-
destroying ideas', 'principles calculated of their very nature to
destroy the basis of all morality' (CW, 3/8).
Archbishop Gough, however, was not without specific support in
the pages of The Catholic Weekly. In the 'Question Box' of the
paper, the well known Catholic apologist, Dr Leslie Rumble, MSC,!
answered Queries from readers about the Archbishop's charges and
the contributions to the controversy by the Andersons, father and
son, A. J. Anderson. Rumble was aware that Gough's charges had
been inca4tiously stated, but he distinguished between the letter and
the spirit pf what had been claimed and used the occasion of the
controversy to attack an old foe and his philosophy from an
informed Catholic viewpoint. Rumble had not read Kinsella's
pamphlet (CW, 19/10) and would not enter into debate on whether
Gough had good grounds for his attack: the presumption had to be,
he claime~, that a man in the Archbishop's position would not
speak as h~ did without such grounds (CW, 17/8). And he would not
support Gough's claim of a direct link between 'a philosophy of
free love ~nd sexual promiscuity' and Communism. But he took the
view that the spirit of Gough's attack served a useful public end.
Archbishop Gough's remarks in any case will have done
nothing but good if they served only to awaken everybody's
attention to the fact that moral standards must be maintained,
and that it is a matter for the national conscience, to see that they
are maintained. (CW, 17/8)
Gough w~s not to be deserted. But John Anderson or Anderson
senior, as Rumble sometimes called him in order to distinguish him
from Anderson junior, his philosopher son at Newcastle, was to be
attacked ip his own right or in his son's words, not Gough's or
Kinsella's~ for what the Andersons said during the controversy. It
1 See Brother B. Delaney, MSC, Father Leslie Rumble, MSC 1892-1975, MSC
Provincialate, n.d., and CW, 13/11/75.
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was a procedure which Rumble followed in answer to questions for
most of the latter half of 1961.1
Before, however, Rumble had finished his treatment of the
Andersons, the Gough's conflict with the Sydney philosophers
helped contribute to a very different sort of controversy within the
circle of Catholic philosophers and academics. On 12 October, Dr
P. M. Farrell OP from the Dominican House of Studies in
Melbourne, published an article in both The Catholic Weekly and
The Advocate (Melbourne) entitled, in the Weekly, as 'Philosophy
and Christianity in Australian Universities'. The article was
prompted, Farrell said, by the way in which the Sydney
philosophers had reacted to the criticisms by Gough and the NSW
Council of Churches.
In their responses, Farrell claimed, 'the slogan "academic
standards" was largely writ'. His criticism was that academic
standards were not being observed by certain philosophers when it
came to the discussion of important matters of religious faith, a
point which he sought to illustrate with references to recent
discussions by J. L. Mackie and H. J. McCloskey on the problem of
evil, and Kurt Baier's inaugural lecture at the Canberra University
College on the meaning of life as well as certain public discussions
at Melbourne and Monash universities. It was in the best interests of
universities, he argued, that proper standards be observed,
particularly when claims are made which are 'offensive to the
beliefs and moral sentiments of a majority (at least statistically
overwhelming) of the Australian community'.
Farrell's comments soon elicited reactions from Catholic
philosophers and intellectuals. University based Catholic
philosophers, especially the six in the eighteen strong Melbourne
department, did not take kindly to Farrell's view that Mackie and
McCloskey had not observed proper standards in their discussions
nor did they think that Baier was fully deserving of Farrell's
strictures. As the controversy continued in the letter columns of The
Catholic Weekly and, more fully in The Advocate the issue turned
from whether secular philosophers observed proper standards to the
different issue as to whether the Catholic defenders of the academic
integrity of these critics of the Faith were properly formed Catholic
philosophers, that is Thomistic philosophers:
1 Sandy Anderson wrote a letter during the controversy, SMH, 22/7, attacking
aspects of the editorial Archbishop Gough and the Philosophers, 5MB, 14/7
from an Andersonian viewpoint. See his 'Following John Anderson', in
Andersonian Papers, Leila Cummings, ed. Dialectic, [Newcastle University
Philosophy Club], 30, 1987, augmented edition, 1993.
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those who have not been formed in the authentic philosophy of
the Church are not qualified in the high questions it engages -
those who have been fanned wholly or principally at a secular
university are therefore rather disqualified. (Ad 26/10)
This was not the first expression of this tension in Catholic circles.
Earlier in 1961, a Catholic university student at Sydney, John Small,
managed to precipitate a troublesome and long running controversy
in the pages of the Catholic Weekly about whether a Catholic
philosopQer had to be a Thomist. The controversy had its origin in
response to a somewhat triumphalist essay on 5t Thomas to mark
the opening of the academic year at the Aquinas Academy (CW,
16/2 & 9/3). In the later controversy, Farrell was not without support
in either Sydney or Melbourne - where the Melbourne philosopher
Max Charlesworth became the chief target of contradiction - for
claims concerning the philosophic trustworthiness in religious
matters of departments in secular universities, even when, as in
Melbourne, a significant number of staff were Christians. The
developIllent of the Farrell controversy, as of the earlier Sydney
based copflict, was the reflection of anxiety about the future of
Catholic philosophy in conservative circles as more Catholics
became members of university departments or studied in them
without the benefit of a training in an institution which accepted
that, to use Farrell's words in another context, 'to depart from him
[Aquinas] is to invite serious danger' (Ad. 21/12).
Long before the Farrell dispute and even before Bishop
Muldoon and Dr Rumble had involved themselves in the
Archbishop's troubles, he had withdrawn from the field of battle. At
first he had been confident of the action he had taken though he
soon became aware that aspects of his claims needed to be more
carefully stated. The course of events after his sermon seem to have
affected Gough in two ways. At first he was confident of the action
he had t~ken though aware that aspects of what he had claimed
needed tQ be more precisely stated. In The Archbishop's Letter for
the August issue of Southern Cross, written on 10 July, he explained
his role in the controversy and included in the issue the relevant
sections of his sermon. He justified his role in terms of the
undertaking given, when consecrated a bishop, to oppose and to
drive away false doctrines. He acknowledged that Dr Kinsella's
evidence had been contested and that his accusation naturally 'has
aroused resentment in University circles' (Se, p.l). But questions
about 'Whether the details of Dr Kinsella's evidence are correct in .
every insfance or not' did not lead him to retreat from the general
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force of Kinsella's claims or his own: 'I can only say', he wrote,
'that 1 hear from time to time of many individual facts which seem
to corroborate the [Kinsella] evidence. I am not suggesting that
these philosophers are wilfully urging students to commit
immorality, but their teaching does result in this kind of conduct'.
And he repeated in a stronger form his claim that the national
welfare required something to be done about this teaching 'in our
universities which cuts right at the heart of Christian doctrine': 'the
problem is not one for the Church only but also for the State' (Se,
p.2).
Before this letter was published, however, the Archbishop seems
to have undergone a change of heart. On 15 July, The Daily
Telegraph reported that the Sydney University Staff Association
had been unable to arrange a mutually suitable time for the
Archbishop to discuss the issues. The same report also included an
item which suggested that the Archbishop probably did not think
that such a meeting was at all necessary. His spokesman was quoted
as saying that 'Dr Gough's sermon was not meant to be an attack
on Sydney University or any other University'. Presumably his
sermon was no longer to be interpreted with reference to Empiricism
and Freedom or the information given to the Archbishop's Moral
Welfare Committee. Within the next few weeks, if not earlier, the
Archbishop's sermon was printed for limited distribution with the
partial qualifying note at the bottom of the last page. And the full
text of the sermon together with the qualifying note appeared in the
20 July issue of The Australian Church Record, the fortnightly
evangelical Anglican paper published in Sydney, where it was
accompanied by a general expression of support, but no editorial.
Why the change? The answer, according to D. R. V. Wood, the
Sydney Vice-chancellor's biographer, is to be found in Sir Stephen
Robert's legal threat against Gough. 'The Archbishop', Wood
writes, 'was soon in touch with him and withdrew the attack. No
further mention of the matter [concerning the University
academics] appeared in the daily press'.]
Stout, a member of the University Senate at this time, who had
received a printed copy of Gough's sermon, with compliments, was
not prepared to let the Archbishop escape so easily. What was this
other evidence which the Archbishop possessed, as implied by his
qualifying note in the privately distributed copy of the sermon? In
an address to the N.S.W. Humanist Society, he attacked Gough's
integrity. Was it Christian to make public claims based on evidence
] D. R. V. Wood, Ope cit., p. 87.
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which allegedly could not be revealed or publicly tested? Was not
the claim of private evidence a mere subterfuge? And he questioned
Gough's courage as a public figure in privately circulating his
qualified withdrawal: 'If the Archbishop meant to make even a
partial withdrawal, why, has he not the courage to do so publicly?'
(SMB, 19/8). Unknown to Stout, Gough had done so a month
earlier in The Australian Church Record. It was probably the only
point, and that mostly unnoticed, where Gough was not victim to his
critics. A sermon which was meant as one churchman's contribution
to 'a courageous lead to the Western World' at a time of Cold War
crisis had achieved only confusion, embarrassment, and the disdain
of many among the clerisy. 'Or Gough's remarks', The Free Spirit
observed, ' ... will confirm a view already far more widespread than
the Archbishop realizes among sensitive and well educated
Australians, that the Australian clergy are worthy do-gooders but
intellectual lightweights, and, at their occasional worst, anti-
intellectual headline-hunters of a peculiarly reprehensible kind'.l
The other figures associated with Gough's attack were taken up
with Sydney philosophers and moral issues for a longer period.
Kinsella brought his claims up to date and widened the target. He
had to acknowledge that those he had named did not teach their
students to engage in immoral conduct but rather had taught
doctrines which made what he took to be moral or immoral
behaviour a matter of individual preference. He also discovered a
new cause of philosophic disorder which enabled him to condemn
not only the post-Anderson university department at Sydney but
also the philosophers at the University of N.S.W. The unifying
principle was John Hosper's An Introduction to Philosophical
Analysis (1959), a text used in first year courses at both places.
Kinsella described Hosper's book as 'unspeakably evil' (DT, 10/8).
Its chief failing in his eyes was (the mistaken claim) that it
The Free Spirit, Bulletin of the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom, 7,
(3/4), May/August, 1961, p. 1. See also Observer in The Bulletin, 15 July,
1961. In the first issue of Southern Cross, June 1961, the Archbishop in his 5
May letter wrote of Christianity and Cold War problems in ways which
anticipate his sermon, and indicated what he believed would be the benefits 'if
the Christian Church will only give a courageous lead to the Western World at
the present time'. (p. 7). Chief Justice Earl Warren, who arrived too late for the
Convention Service, provided a different analysis of the Cold War problems
for the Western Democracies though with no reference to the controversy
absorbing Sydney at the time: 'One of the great problems of the free world is to
preserve all these human rights ... We must not find ourselves in the position
where, because we fear totalitarianism we abandon these fundamental rights in
order to protect ourselves.' (DT, 13/7).
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encouraged ethical subjectivism. 1 He recommended that both
departments be re-staffed with philosophers free of such views.
This was all part of a further submission to the Curlewis
Committee which, like the claims in Empiricism and Freedom, did
not finally receive the Committee's endorsement. One matter,
however, in which Kinsella was involved to some degree did become
part of a continuing concern for the Committee, and for a while for
the universities. During the 1962 orientation week activities at
Sydney and N.S.W., one speaker, Dr Peter Kenny took part in
symposia at the two universities. In typical 'terrae filius' style,
Kenny assailed common sexual prohibitions and taboos. Kinsella, a
fellow symposiast at N.S.W., protested to the Committee about
Kenny's performances and linked his claims to what was and had
been taught in the universities. The Committee referred Kinsella's
letter to the Attorney-General and asked the Vice-Chancellors for
information. As Kenny was a PhD in psychology from Sydney, his
remarks were taken by Kinsella to show how Psychology there had
been corrupted by the philosophers, so he recommended that the
Philosophy and Psychology departments at Sydney and Philosophy
and Sociology at N.S.W. be closed. These philosophic matters
finally did not concern the Curlewis Committee but it thought that
the claims about the orientation week functions touched on
problems of substance. It reported that while the issues raised (by
Kenny) were fit matters for discussion by young people, 'the
particular way in which they were raised and the views advocated
were highly undesirable for the particular audience'. It accepted
that it was a matter for control by the authorities at the Universities:
'steps had been taken at both Universities to ensure that similar
happenings will not occur again'.2 The Curlewis Committee's
central recommendation that the Government should establish a
residential Leadership Training College for the training of youth
workers was not accepted by the Labor Government on grounds of
Hosper's own preference in his survey of moral theories seems to be for G. E.
Moore's objectivist doctrine of goodness as a non-natural quality. See An
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, London, 1956, p. 494. Kinsella
developed his views at length in the popular pictorial magazine, Pix, 16
September, 1961.
2 Report, p. 33. See HS, 5/6/62: 'The Chancellor [Sir Charles Bickerton
Blackburn] has told the S.R.C. that there are to be no more symposia on the
subject of sex in Orientation Week. The S.R.C. decided on May 14 to reject
this ultimatum.' Sir Stephen Roberts said 'the action had to be taken because of
adverse publicity arising from the Kinsella-Kenny clash at a symposium at the
University of New South Wales.'
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expense as the State Premier, Mr Renshaw, explained in the
Legislative Assembly on 29 October, 1964.
v
When James McAuley was offered Empiricism and Freedom for
publication in Quadrant he advised Kinsella 'that he did not know
what was taught in the Philosophy Department and did not
appreciate the nature of a modem university and that he would do
harm if he published his text'. 1For the most part McAuley was
right. Yet despite the confusion, distraction, and offence which the
pamphlet helped bring about, the result of the Kinsella-Gough
offensive was not entirely negative. That this was so owed much to
E. L. Wheelwright, a lecturer in Economics at Sydney University
and A. K. Stout.
In 1961 Wheelwright was editor of Vestes, the Journal of the
Federal Council of University Staff Associations of Australia. Vestes,
which first appeared in 1958, sought to inform Staff Association
members in the Australian universities on a wide variety of
university affairs ranging from recent appointments and
resignations in universities and salary matters to policy issues and
problems concerning the post-Murray report on the growth of the
university system, academic disciplines and studies in the
universities, and controversies such as the Orr Case in Tasmania.
Archbishop Gough's widely reported attack was a matter of natural
interest to the Vestes readership. Wheelwright asked Stout, as he
reported, 'to tell the whole story as I saw it'.2 Stout's 'The
Archbishop and the Philosophers' appeared in Vestes, 4, September,
1961.
The story, as Stout saw it, could hardly be dignified as the
history of a controversy since 'no evidence has been offered, no
specific charges made which it was possible to controvert' (p.3?).
But Stout was determined not to let the story rest at that point. It had
to yield a moral or a number of morals from which those seriously
concerned with the welfare of universities could learn. Stout
effectively put himself into the Archbishop's shoes and provided a
lames McAuley, 'The Catholic Image', in Religious Denominations and
Australia's Needs: Is More Co-Operation Possible?, Institute of Social Order,
Melbourne, 1961, p. 35. McAuley was a former student of Anderson's; see
'Some Andersonians', The Bulletin, 30/6/62.
2 A. K. Stout, 'The Archbishop and the Philosophers', in Vestes, 4, (3)
September, 1961, p. 37.
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series of issues, 'the real issues', which the Archbishop should have
asked.
The pity of it is that there are a number of important issues well
worth discussing which could have been raised by the
Archbishop. They include the place of religion in a university,
the nature of philosophy and of philosophical teaching in
universities, and in Sydney University in particular, the relation
of religion to morality and of recent developments in moral
philosophy to religious belief (I hold the view that these leave a
clearly defined place for religious faith which was not there
before, and I point this out to my students), the nature of
university teaching in general (authoritarian or not?), the
meaning and scope of 'academic freedom', the difference
between discussion. of a principle and 'advocacy' of a practice,
the question whether students are to be treated as children or as
adults, the question whether in a university truth is or not to
come first. (p.37)
The issues were not, of course, new to the senior figures involved in
the Gough controversy and its ramifications. Concern about the
orientation of philosophy in Anderson' s department had led to
Stout's appointment in 1939. And Anderson had been the centre of
a large scale controversy concerning religion and education in
1943. The issue of the study of religion as distinct from historical
and philosophical theology in the BD course at Sydney, introduced
in 1937, had long been a concern of the University professors on
the Board of Studies in Divinity. They sought a widening and
'strengthening of the BD course on the side of general theory', but
the divines on the Board from the theological colleges who did most
of the teaching, were not prepared to allow this development at the
cost of historical and philosophical theology.l Most of the issues to
which Stout drew attention were standing issues for critically
minded academics but they had been given a public relevance by
the circumstances of the Archbishop's attack, the running conflicts
surrounding the Orr case, in which Stout and Anderson were deeply
involved, and developing plans to expand the university system. The
post-war revival of interest in religious matters amongst students and
some of the younger academics appointed from this generation
gave a further degree of relevance to the place of religion in the
university.
1 See Minutes of the Board of Studies in Divinity, 21 June, 1947.
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In Stout's Papers in the University Archives and elsewhere there
are to be found his contributions to some of these issues. For the
discussion in Vestes, the place of philosophy in the university was
given to Stout's professorial colleague, J. L. Mackie, and the place
of religion in the university to two other Sydney University
identities, Felix Arnott, and, in the first instance, John Anderson.
Mackie's article, 'Philosophy - Its Place in the Universities'
appeared with Stout's paper in the same September, 1961 issue of
Vestes. In the course of six pages he succinctly presents his views
about the nature and development of philosophy as a subject, its
importance for the university community, the way it is to be taught
and how departments are to be staffed.
Philosophy, he points out, is a controversial subject which often
deals with matters which are apt to arouse strong feelings. Its
primary subject matter are the issues 'that are fundamental· for a
view of the world and man's place in it' (p.39). Discussions of these
issues, however, have given rise to matters of secondary interest,
from a lay point of view, such as questions about method of
argument, the sources of knowledge, and more recently the nature
of linguistic meaning. This secondary subject matter raises many
new philosophical issues, but the primary issues remain a central
philosophic concern: 'the big fundamental questions are still there,
and part of the purpose of philosophising is still to argue them'
(p.40).
The place of philosophy in higher education is based on the
importance of this primary subject matter. Yet it is a field of inquiry
surrounded with controversy:
There are as yet no agreed and authoritative answers, but
progress has been made, many confusions have been
conclusively exposed, many incoherent systems of thought can
be eliminated and the possible coherent systems thus limited in
number. (p.40)
Because the proposed answers to these primary problems are
contested amongst philosophers, a lecturer, Mackie claimed, should
take care to carefully state the opposed positions, carefully
explaining the reasons why they are maintained 'as well as the
grounds on which he adopts those that he holds himself (p.45). In
his teaching, the lecturer will not play the role of an advocate, that is,
one who seeks to persuade his students to accept his position or to
reject others. Yet in his presentation of positions, his own and others,
the lecturer must take care to bring out the systematic character of
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the body of philosophical doctrine in question, the way 'in which
views on logic, ethics, epistemology and metaphysics support and
illustrate one another' (p.42). This approach, Mackie claimed, 'is a
valuable corrective to the piecemeal treatment of philosophy as an
assortment of puzzles, and it may be a stimulating challenge to
thought, whether in the end one accepts the system presented or
not' (p.42).
Some of what Mackie has to say would have been contested by
certain philosophers at the time, as might be expected. Much of it,
however, accords with the views and practices he would have
encountered as an undergraduate in Anderson's department. l But
on one important matter he suggests a sharp point of difference
with the way in which Anderson held that philosophy should be
taught and researched within a philosophy department. The
systematic character of philosophy teaching within a department
should not, if circumstances allow, be a systematic teaching from the
viewpoint of one philosophic system: 'a philosophy department is
more likely to be vigorous if there is controversy within it, and if
there is sufficient diversity of views to promote controversy' (p.43).
There is no need, Mackie claimed, to plan or to impose such
diversity, particularly to meet demands from outside the university:
the ordinary procedure of appointing the best candidates to
positions as vacancies occur is sufficient.
The Department of Philosophy of which Stout and Mackie were
professors contained a marked diversity of philosophic viewpoints,
as Stout had been keen to stress. This welcoming of diversity within
the Department was one of the points which Anderson took up in
his solicited paper, 'Religion and the University'. 'This', he argued,
'is the doctrine of philosophy as "arena", not as subject, and it is
anything but conducive to the students' educational progress'.2
The academic readers of Vestes, however, were not to see
Anderson's paper. The editor had refused to accept the paper
without substantial revisions because he thought it too closely
related to the particular details of the Gough controversy and 'it did
not give enough consideration to the practice of Universities, on
both counts not being sufficiently general for an adequate treatment
1 Mackie's 'The Philosophy of John Anderson', in Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 40, 1962, pp. 265-82, is his important critical appreciation of
his old teacher. See John McD'owell, 'John Leslie Mackie 1917-1981', in
Proceedings of the British Academy, 76, 1990.
2 J. Anderson, 'Religion and the University', in The Australian Highway,
November, 1961, p. 52.
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of the subject'. 1 Anderson refused to revise the paper and
published it in The Australian Highway, November, 1961, the
journal of the Worker's Educational Association of NSW. The
article is in large part a critical response from his own distinctive
position to statements made or appearing late in the Gough
controversy. He particularly stresses that theological ethics is weak
on content and confused and he contrasts it with his own theory of
ethics as concerned with goodness, a natural quality, free of what he
takes to be the confused nqtions of moral imperatives and
obligations. But, he claimed, despite the difference between his
ethics and other moral theories, he claimed that both were seeking
to deal with the same moral phenomena. 'I take the positive subject
which even the loose theories of morals are struggling with to be
that of culture, of departments of social life in which disinterested
activities such as art and inquiry are sustained through institutions
and traditions'.2
The result of Anderson' s refusal to revise his paper meant that
the next item to appear as originally intended was F. R. Arnott's
'Religion and the University', Vestes 5, (1), March, 1962. Arnott,
later to be Anglican Archbishop of Brisbane and a member of the
Royal Commission on Human ~elationships, had become Warden
of 5t Paul's College at the Up.iversity in 1946 and was a long
serving member of the University's Board of Studies in Divinity.
Not surprisingly, he took the issue of the place of religion in the
university to be the place of the Christian religion.
Arnott's discussion consists in the building up of a cumulative
case for the university study of the Christian religion, attacking the
reasons which have been advaqced against it and putting forward
reasons which support it. The secular character of Australian, he
argued, should not be taken as an endorsement of a secularist
university as is indicated, for 'example, by the Preamble of the
University of Sydney Act of Incprporation with its reference to 'the
better advancement of religion and morality and the promotion of
useful knowledge' and support for the foundation of
denominational colleges in the foundation of the University (p.38).
'The secular nature of the Australian universities', he wrote, 'must
not be assumed too readily. They [the university founders] rightly
in a modem democracy sought no religious tests, but they were not
1 Ibid., p. 50
2 Ibid., p. 53. Mackie had suggested in 'A Refutation of Morals', in Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 24, 1946, p. 90 that Anderson's theory of goodness
'has very few of the relations and other features that we have been in the habit
of associating with goodness.'
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hostile to religion itself' (p.39). Yet, if now weakening sectarian
rivalries had previously kept the study of the Christian faith from
having a place in the earlier lives of the developing universities, it
ought not to be assumed that the study of religious issues should
continue to be excluded from the academic work of the universities:
The university often professes its neutrality on ultimate
questions, whether political or religious, but this does not mean
that they should be ignored, and our thinking conditioned to
believe they do not matter'. (p.36)
But what religion or religions should be studied and how? Arnott's
answer to the first question was that all religions could be properly
studied in the secular university and many in fact were: 'courses in
Islamic and Semitic studies, primitive religions in its anthropology
schools, Indian and Chinese religion in its schools of Oriental
Studies' (p.36). The major exception was the Christian religion:
'Bible or Theology' often seemed to be excluded though the
situation had changed to some extent in the last twenty five years
with developments such as the post-graduate BD program at
Sydney. Such opportunities, he argued, ought to be widened and a
first degree in Theology introduced into Australian universities.
The basic principle upon Amott relied in making this claim is
that 'The University is a microcosm of our civilization as a whole'
(p.36). And, following T. S. Eliot, he claimed that civilization or
culture was still Christian, even though Christianity was no longer
the dominant set of ideas in the culture, for no alternate set of ideas
had so far succeeded it. Christianity, understood in this way, retains
a special right to be studied in the university under the usual
conditions of academic life as do the 'other principles of modem
thought' (pp.37-8). And those training for the Christian ministry
have as much right to a university education as do those entering
the traditional professions and others 'in applied pursuits like
journalism, pharmacy, physical education and social work'.
'Christianity', Arnott claimed, 'is not yet a minority group in our
'neutral' culture, and may therefore demand the privilege of its
adherents enjoying the freedom for instruction in its tenets and the
encouragement of its virtues, a state beneficial for Church and
Commonwealth alike' (p.36).
But can the Christian religion be studied in the open and critical
fashion of the university? Arnott had no doubt that it could. The
root of this problem, he maintained, is to be found in the nineteenth
century conflict 'between Biblical Fundamentalism and modem
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Biology', but this he believed was a passing phase in the history of
the Christian religion and science based on a biblical literalism 'that
had developed in the late eighteenth century' and which had now
been rectified by 'a vast change in Biblical Scholarship' (p.38) and
revised Church attitudes towards science since Darwin's time.
The way is now open, Arnott claimed, for Australian universities
to follow the recent British example and establish theological
faculties or departments. Such departments would have to be
entirely free of any concerns about heresy and orthodoxy and be
non-denominational in teaching. Their staffs would have to be
appointed in accord with the same standards that apply elsewhere in
the university and they would have to teach and research in the
same critical spirit. Would the staff to be appointed have to be
Christian? Arnott did not answer this question, but in view of some
of the gains that he thought would follow the establishment of
departments of theology, such as pastoral benefits, the answer would
seem to be yes, which would seem to be at odds with other aspects
of his paper. His general position, however, is summed up in the
claim 'It would seem mere prejudice to maintain that religion has
no title to a place in an academic world' (p.41).
With Anderson's unwillingness to revise his paper, the task of
providing a secularist viewpoint to balance Arnott's article with one
of the same name fell to J. L. Mackie. He was a natural choice. A
sometime member of Anderson' s school, he held to the view that no
religious metaphysic or theological system provides the truth about
man's place in nature. 1 He was also hostile to calls such as Arnott's
for the university to provide a home for a department or faculty
given to the promotion of a particular religious position. He saw
such calls as belonging to the same category as the recent attacks by
Gough and Kinsella on the Sydney philosophers and the pressure
by the Catholic church for its own university. 'It is important to
see', he wrote in Vestes, 5, (3), September 1962, 'that these diverse
demands express different attitudes of a common attitude to the
universities; the present universities, it is felt, are godless, either
positively, or at least negatively, by hostility to or neglect of
religion, and we should either make the existing universities more
religious or provide others that are based explicitly on religion'
(p.6).
Mackie's hostility to such claims was not driven so much by his
convictions about the falsity of Christianity and other theistic faiths,
See J. L. Mackie, 'Dogmatism and Understanding', in Quadrant, 4, (4), 1960,
p. 12. His most comprehensive statement of the case against theism is the
ironically titled, The Miracle of Theism, Oxford, 1982, see p. 12.
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but by his belief that a religious presence could not easily be
separated from attitudes and policies which were inimical to the
spirit of criticism within the university. Religion, whether as a
practice or as study, was apt to bring with it the censorship of
opinions, outside demands for orthodoxy in belief, methods of
enquiry which were insufficiently critical or dependent upon a
'supernatural, supra-rational act of faith' (p.9), unquestioning
assumptions about the intellectual plausibility of theistic faith, and
shallow views, such as Arnott's, who is never mentioned by name,
about the challenge posed by science to religious views.
Accordingly Mackie' s discussion of the place of religion in
university life is in large part a strongly directed warning against the
dangers of accepting the sort of recommendations made by Arnott
and others like him.
Yet Mackie was well aware that the topic of religion in the
university could not be put to one side simply because of these
concerns. He also knew that various churchmen had spoken out in
defence of the university and the philosophers in the recent
Kinsella-Gough controversies against religiously motivated
'blatantly anti-academic' demands : 'it is only fair to record that
other adherents of religion have publicly supported academic
principles against these demands' (p.l2). Furthermore, he knew that
the question of the academic study of religion in the university
could not wait upon agreed rational answers to 'the substantive
questions' of 'the nature and the truth of the relevant religious
doctrines' (p.6) And in Sydney, at least, it had to be acknowledged
that the advancement of religion and morality was part of the
charter of the University, as Arnott and other churchmen pointed
out l : it 'made certain concessions to the religious view' (p.9)
How then is the academic study of religion, particularly the
Christian religion, to be approached? The answer, according to
Mackie, has to be in terms of the principles 'that govern the
relationship between the university and religion' (p.6). But what are
these? At the outset Mackie tacitly sets aside the governing principle
of Amott's approach. Arnott's view was that the university is a
creation of society and cannot hold itself altogether separate from
the needs and interests of the society which sustains it. And Amott's
case, as far as Sydney was concerned, was strengthened by the fact
that the exclusion of the teaching of theology and divinity from the
Anderson's view was that 'what the Act gave was not a prescription but a
prediction, viz., that religion and morality would be advanced and useful
knowledge promoted if the University were set up as part of a system of liberal
education'. loco cit., p. 51.
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curriculum in the Act establishing the University had been repealed
in 1936. Mackie, however, would not follow this line of argument, at
least as stated py Arnott. His general response to Arnott's point can,
however, be easily inferred. The sort of interests and procedures to
be accepted wtthin any institution set up by the state depend upon
the sort of institution it is designed to be. In the case of the
university, Mackie claimed, its purpose is critical enquiry: 'A
university as such has the task and the right of enquiring honestly
into all fields pf knowledge' (p.6). Religious claims to a higher or
sacrosanct knowledge or to a special sensitivity or respect for
teaching about religious matters are not to be tolerated in the
university any more than similar claims about the moral tendencies
which might flpw from certain teachings within the university.
It is not, of course, the business of such departments to
recommend any morality, conventional or unconventional; but
if their teaching' has an indirect effect on conduct this can only
be because it enquires into relevant facts and into the status of
ethical concepts. A university department has every right to
carry on such enquiries, and if its conclusions are damaging to
some established beliefs, this may show that those beliefs are in
need of revision, not that its enquiries should be suppressed; we
need not respect the claim of outside institutions to know what is
right or wJ;ong in advance of any rational enquiry. (p.?)
How then is the study of religion or religions to fit into the
academic structures and curriculum of such an institution? In the
absence of agreed answers concerning 'the substantial questions',
its place has to be determined by the availability of the material to
be investigated, its integrity either as a field to be investigated by a
single discipline or its unity as an area which can be investigated by
a variety of pisciplines. Such an approach rules out any subject
which rests its claims on a special way of knowing - 'there are no
facts to which in principle there can only be one way of access'l
(p.10) - or ope in which the matter to be investigated is so
heterogeneous that its unity simply reflects the imposition of an
arbitrary interest on the material.
Mackie divides the fields of acceptable religious study into three
groups. First, there are subjects such as 'biblical studies', which had
recently been introduced as a course in Arts at Sydney under E. C.
B. MacLaurin. 'The geographical, linguistic, social, historical and.
The basis of this claim is not provided.
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archaeological background of the biblical writings constitutes a
subject, or related group of subjects, which can be appropriately
studied in an academic spirit and at the university level' (p.7). As
an 'area study' involving a number of disciplines, this and other
inter-disciplinary studies are apt to be theoretically weaker than the
single discipline based subjects, but, Mackie argued, this is less of a
problem when the traditional subjects are strongly represented in
the university. Secondly, there are questions that arise in natural
theology, issues 'about the existence and nature of God and related
matters'. This is an area of philosophical study, worthy of a place in
universities either in departments of philosophy or in some special
department set aside for such issues. Whatever the organisational
arrangements for the study of these matters, 'it is clear', Mackie
claimed, 'that it must be taught in a philosophically competent way,
by university teachers with an adequate knowledge of general
philosophy' (p.S). They must be able to develop their own views
about natural theology free of any requirement to defend or to
oppose orthodox religious views on such issues. Natural theology
thus understood could also embrace issues about allegedly
'revealed knowledge' or what is called 'theology in the strict sense'
if the basis of such a study - the possibility of revealed knowledge
and the criteria for accepting any knowledge claim as revealed - is a
principal consideration. Theology understood in this way would
seem to be a largely philosophical study of religious and
theological claims:
Theology, then, has a place in university courses only in so far
as it is a rational and philosophical study, but it is then one
subject, not a cluster of alternative opinions or doctrines, and for
all that we can settle in advance an atheist might make the best
professor of theology. (p.9)
Thirdly, Mackie allowed that the history of doctrines had a
legitimate place in university studies. How doctrines developed, the
problems they encountered, why they were rejected or fell into
disuse, their influence upon the life of their times and later, and so
on, is an established field of academic study. 'This is a branch of
the history of ideas. It is an entirely reputable academic subject,
though it may appeal only to a limited audience' (p.9). But what
particular tradition of historical theology should be studied? The
answer depends, Mackie claimed, on which particular religion is
thought to be the true religion. If the Christian religion is not true
or not regarded as true, then the history of doctrines in another
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religion might well be regarded as more deserving of a place in the
university curriculum than doctrines in the Christian tradition. But
the problem, he pointed out, relates not only to Christianity but to
its rivals. If the truth or falsity of a religion is to be the guide as to
whether or not its history is of importance for university study then
it is possible that no one religion has priority over any other. In that
case, he argued, 'comparative religion or comparative theology'
might be the most important area for the study of the history of
religious ideas and their development. 1
But if it turned out that all religions were in their main doctrines,
false, or alternatively that what was true was some element
common to many or all of them, then comparative religion or
comparative theology would be likely to be far more
illuminating than the separate study of the systems of thought
evolved by the adherents of one religion alone. (p.9)
VI
In 1972, ten years after the Vestes articles, the executive of the
Australian and New Zealand Society for Theological Studies, in
which Jim Tulip was a leading figure, put out a collection of
documents and articles which they hoped would serve as 'a useful
too}' for those 'who see the possibility of introducing or extending
the study of religion andlor theology in the universities of our two
countries'.2 Neither Arnott's nor Mackie's articles were included,
but they were probably not known to the compilers. Traces of one
article and perhaps both are probably be found in one of the
documents contained in the collection, The Martin Committee
Report of 1964 Chap. 15: Theological Training in Australia. It
would be surprising if there were not as they are amongst the few
academic articles canvassing such matters at this time.
Mackie's article is in most respects an application of the principles found in
Anderson's 1943 paper, 'Religion and Education', op. cit. to the university
situation whereas Anderson was concerned with schools.
2 Australian and New Zealand Society for Theological Studies, The Study of
Religion and Theology in Australian and New Zealand Tertiary Institutions,
Sydney, 1972, p. 1. On this Society, see my 'The Founding of ANZSTS and the
Bishop of Newcastle's 1966 Conference on Theological Education',
Colloquium, 23, (3), 1991.
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The Martin Committee or The Committee on the Future of
Tertiary Education in Australia under the chairmanship of Sir
Lesley Martin was appointed in August, 1961 by the Prime Minister,
Sir Robert Menzies, to consider 'the pattern of tertiary education in
relation to the needs and resources of Australia' for the purpose of
making recommendations 'to the Australian Universities
Commission on the future development of tertiary education'. 1 For
the Martin Committee, theological colleges and theological training
came within reach of its activities because it took its brief to include
consideration of all education following a full secondary school
training. To help it in this particular task, the Committee appointed
a group of churchmen 'to investigate, on its behalf, the present
position with regard to theological training' (ch.i5.iO). Felix
Arnott was the Anglican representative.
The spirit and argument of Arnott's Vestes article is certainly
present in the group's cautious attempt to sound out the
Committee's attitude towards the provision of publicly funded
theological studies in universities.
In its report to the Committee the group has referred to the
possibility that theological studies will be provided in
universities, mentioning the possibility mainly 'to indicate that
the climate is now favourable for theological studies at the
universities and that the cordial co-operation of all
denominations has removed an obstacle that hitherto has caused
hesitation on the part of university governing bodies'. (15.50)
The Martin Committee, however, would not recommend any direct
Federal funding for theological training which 'deals with the
furtherance of religious beliefs' (15.51); 'it would not be
appropriate for Commonwealth and state funds to be made available
for training in the views and beliefs of any particular religious
group' (15.52). Responsibility for such training, it held, belongs to
the denominational theological colleges. The Committee, however,
was prepared to meet group's tentative recommendation half-way.
In accord with its views of enhancing the benefits of 'both general
education and specialized education at all levels' (1.26), it
suggested that the special needs of ministerial training could be met,
in part, if secular tertiary institutions were to provide courses in
areas particularly appropriate for those who intended to undertake
theological training.
1 Tertiary Education in Australia: Report of the Committee, Melbourne, 1964, p.
iv.
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It is suggested, therefore, that Australian universities and the
proposed Institutes of Colleges and Boards of Teacher
Education might consider the advisability of offering a wider
range of courses in subject which would be appropriate for
theological training. The Committee does not contemplate the
possibility that institutions would offer training in beliefs,
although courses might doubtless be available in comparative
religion, theological (jncluding biblical) history, early specialist
languages for the understanding of manuscript material and
original texts, classic'll languages and literature, ancient history
and archaeology. (15.43).
The policy was more in line with Mackie's approach than Arnott's,
but more for constitution~l reasons than philosophical.
***********
Fourteen years after the Martin Report, the Department of Religious
Studies at the University of Sydney offered its first courses, taught
by Professor Eric Sharpe and Dr Garry Trompf. Its aim was more
or less in accord with the sort of academic policy recommended by
the Report, but reflecting the changes which had occurred in the
study of religion in the recent past. l It treated the consideration of
religion in its diversity as a worthwhile 'non-confessional' area
study in its own right, open to staff and students who 'may be of
any faith or none', and it made use of the phenomenological
method as one of its means in understanding religion. According to
the Arts Handbook 1978,
Its overall aim is to provide an understanding of the phenomena
of religion within the total context of Primal, Eastern and
Westem Cultures. Its methods are those of history, sociology,
psychology and phenomenology applied to specific areas of
human experience.
The new department wOQld work closely with the Board of Studies
in Divinity though 'it does not aim at providing ministerial training
for the ministry or the priesthood'.2
1 See Eric J. Sharpe, Comparative Religion, 2nd. ed., London, 1986, ch. 13.
2 The continuing Sydney quest for a first degree in theology is told in John Hill,
'The Foundation of the Syqney College of Divinity', Parts 1 & 11, in Journal of
Christian Education, Papers 88 (April, 1987) and Papers 89 (July, 1987).
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